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Equilibrium and efficiency in auctions of complementary goods without bundling

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  • Kim, Hee-Su

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  • Kim, Hee-Su, 1996. "Equilibrium and efficiency in auctions of complementary goods without bundling," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 49-54, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:52:y:1996:i:1:p:49-54
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans & Robert J. Weber, 1979. "An Example of a Multi-Object Auction Game," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 25(12), pages 1272-1277, December.
    2. Riley, John G & Samuelson, William F, 1981. "Optimal Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 381-392, June.
    3. Maskin, Eric S & Riley, John G, 1984. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1473-1518, November.
    4. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, March.
    5. Roger B. Myerson, 1981. "Optimal Auction Design," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 6(1), pages 58-73, February.
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