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An Example of a Multi-Object Auction Game


  • Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans

    (Yale University)

  • Robert J. Weber

    (Northwestern University)


Concurrent auctions of several objects are traditionally analyzed as if they were independent single-object auctions. Such an approximation may be very crude if bidders have budgetary restrictions, capacity constraints, or, in general, have non-linear utility functions. This paper presents a very simple multi-object auction for which explicit equilibrium strategies can be calculated; these equilibrium strategies have several qualitative characteristics arising from the multi-object nature of the example and therefore not present in typical single-object auctions. In particular, these results suggest that the observed variance in bids for offshore oil leases is not solely due to bidder uncertainty, but also to the method of auction currently employed.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans & Robert J. Weber, 1979. "An Example of a Multi-Object Auction Game," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 25(12), pages 1272-1277, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:25:y:1979:i:12:p:1272-1277

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Ian I. Mitroff, 1972. "The Myth of Objectivity OR Why Science Needs a New Psychology of Science," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 18(10), pages 613-618, June.
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    1. repec:spr:infosf:v:14:y:2012:i:2:d:10.1007_s10796-010-9249-x is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Ravi Bapna & Chrysanthos Dellarocas & Sarah Rice, 2010. "Vertically Differentiated Simultaneous Vickrey Auctions: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 56(7), pages 1074-1092, July.
    3. Pitchik, Carolyn, 2009. "Budget-constrained sequential auctions with incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 928-949, July.
    4. Cramton, Peter C, 1995. "Money Out of Thin Air: The Nationwide Narrowband PCS Auction," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(2), pages 267-343, Summer.
    5. Kim, Hee-Su, 1996. "Equilibrium and efficiency in auctions of complementary goods without bundling," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 49-54, July.
    6. Elena Katok & Alvin E. Roth, 2004. "Auctions of Homogeneous Goods with Increasing Returns: Experimental Comparison of Alternative "Dutch" Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 50(8), pages 1044-1063, August.
    7. Sulin Ba & Jan Stallaert & Andrew B. Whinston, 2001. "Optimal Investment in Knowledge Within a Firm Using a Market Mechanism," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 47(9), pages 1203-1219, September.
    8. Wellman, Michael P. & Sodomka, Eric & Greenwald, Amy, 2017. "Self-confirming price-prediction strategies for simultaneous one-shot auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 339-372.

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