A note on estimation of two-sided matching models
We propose an estimation strategy for two-sided matching models with non-transferable utility based on the characterization using pre-matching that exploits a fixed-point characterization of the set of stable matchings.
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- Morten Sørensen, 2007. "How Smart Is Smart Money? A Two-Sided Matching Model of Venture Capital," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 62(6), pages 2725-2762, December.
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- Federico Echenique & Jorge Oviedo, 2004.
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Game Theory and Information
- Echenique, Federico & Oviedo, Jorge, 2006. "A theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(2), pages 233-273, June.
- Jorge Oviedo & Federico Echenique, 2005. "A Theory of Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Markets," 2005 Meeting Papers 233, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Echenique, Federico & Oviedo, Jorge, 2003. "A Theory of Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Markets," Working Papers 1185, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Federico Echenique & Jorge Oviedo, 2003. "A Theory of Stability in Many-to-many Matching Markets," Levine's Working Paper Archive 666156000000000374, David K. Levine.
- Jeremy T. Fox, 2009.
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- John William Hatfield & Paul R. Milgrom, 2005.
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- Eugene Choo & Aloysius Siow, 2006. "Who Marries Whom and Why," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(1), pages 175-201, February.
- Michael Ostrovsky, 2008. "Stability in Supply Chain Networks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 897-923, June.
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