Implementation of individually rational social choice functions with guaranteed utilities
A simple mechanism is presented that allocates an indivisible object between two agents for almost any possible compensation rule. Furthermore, the equilibrium strategy guarantees a level of utility not less than -[epsilon], where [epsilon] can be arbitrarily small.
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