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Frictional matching: Evidence from law school admission

Author

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  • Courty, Pascal
  • Pagliero, Mario

Abstract

We measure friction as the number of unnecessary student applications and school admissions that have to be undertaken per actual matriculation. Friction increases with student and school attractiveness with a decrease at the top.

Suggested Citation

  • Courty, Pascal & Pagliero, Mario, 2010. "Frictional matching: Evidence from law school admission," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 108(2), pages 208-211, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:108:y:2010:i:2:p:208-211
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Robert Shimer & Lones Smith, 2000. "Assortative Matching and Search," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(2), pages 343-370, March.
    2. Becker, Gary S, 1973. "A Theory of Marriage: Part I," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(4), pages 813-846, July-Aug..
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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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