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Frictional Matching: Evidence from Law School Admission

Author

Listed:
  • Pascal Courty
  • Mario Pagliero

Abstract

We measure friction in the matching of students and law schools as the number of unnecessary student applications and school admissions that have to be undertaken per actual matriculation. We show that friction increases with student and school attractiveness, but decreases for top schools and students. We discuss connections with the literature on frictional matching.

Suggested Citation

  • Pascal Courty & Mario Pagliero, 2009. "Frictional Matching: Evidence from Law School Admission," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 113, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    • Handle: RePEc:cca:wpaper:113
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Robert Shimer & Lones Smith, 2000. "Assortative Matching and Search," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(2), pages 343-370, March.
    2. Becker, Gary S, 1973. "A Theory of Marriage: Part I," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(4), pages 813-846, July-Aug..
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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