Winner's curse in toll road concessions
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- Laure Athias & Antonio Núñez, 2008. "Winner's curse in toll road concessions," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00331821, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Eduardo Engel & Ronald Fischer & Alexander Galetovic, 2015. "Soft Budgets and Renegotiations in Public-Private Partnerships:Theory and Evidence," Working Papers wp408, University of Chile, Department of Economics.
- Diego Aycinena & Rimvydas Baltaduonis & Lucas Rentschler, 2014. "Valuation structure in first-price and least-revenue auctions: an experimental investigation," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 17(1), pages 100-128, March.
- Eduardo Engel & Ronald Fischer & Alexander Galetovic, 2015. "Soft Budgets and Renegotiations in Public-Private Partnerships: Theory and Evidence," Documentos de Trabajo 317, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
- Loyola, Gino, 2012. "Optimal and efficient takeover contests with toeholds," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 203-216.
- Elisabetta Iossa, 2015.
"Contract and procurement design for PPPs in highways: the road ahead,"
Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics,
Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, vol. 42(3), pages 245-276, September.
- Elisabetta Iossa, 2015. "Contract and Procurement Design for PPPs in Highways: the Road Ahead," CEIS Research Paper 345, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 11 Jun 2015.
- Matthew Ryan & Flávio Menezes, 2015.
"Public-private partnerships for transport infrastructure: Some efficiency risks,"
New Zealand Economic Papers,
Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 49(3), pages 276-295, August.
- Matthew Ryan & Flavio Menezes, 2014. "Public-Private Partnerships for Transport Infrastructure: Some Efficiency Risks," Discussion Papers Series 499, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
- Reza Farrahi Moghaddam & Fereydoun Farrahi Moghaddam & Mohamed Cheriet, 2014. "A Multi-Entity Input Output (MEIO) Approach to Sustainability - Water-Energy-GHG (WEG) Footprint Statements in Use Cases from Auto and Telco Industries," Papers 1404.6227, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2014.
- Athias, Laure, 2007. "Political accountability, incentives, and Contractual design of public private partnerships," MPRA Paper 10538, University Library of Munich, Germany.
More about this item
KeywordsAuctions Common value Winner's curse Incomplete contracts Concessions;
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