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Simulation of common pool resource field experiments: a behavioral model of collective action

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  • Castillo, Daniel
  • Saysel, Ali Kerem

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  • Castillo, Daniel & Saysel, Ali Kerem, 2005. "Simulation of common pool resource field experiments: a behavioral model of collective action," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 420-436, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:55:y:2005:i:3:p:420-436
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Cardenas, Juan Camilo & Stranlund, John & Willis, Cleve, 2000. "Local Environmental Control and Institutional Crowding-Out," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 28(10), pages 1719-1733, October.
    2. Sally, David, 2001. "On sympathy and games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 1-30, January.
    3. Gintis, Herbert, 2000. "Beyond Homo economicus: evidence from experimental economics," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 311-322, December.
    4. Elinor Ostrom, 2000. "Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 137-158, Summer.
    5. Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, 2002. "Why Social Preferences Matter -- The Impact of Non-Selfish Motives on Competition, Cooperation and Incentives," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(478), pages 1-33, March.
    6. H. Scott Gordon, 1954. "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62, pages 124-124.
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    Cited by:

    1. Meijerink, Gerdien W., 2007. "If services aren't delivered, people won't pay: the role of measurement problems and monitoring in Payments for Environmental Services," 106th Seminar, October 25-27, 2007, Montpellier, France 7948, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    2. Moreno-Sanchez, Rocio del Pilar & Maldonado, Jorge Higinio, 2009. "Can Co-Management Improve the Governance of A Common- Pool Resource? Lessons From A Framed Field Experiment in A Marine Protected Area in the Colombian Caribbean," Documentos CEDE Series 60731, Universidad de Los Andes, Economics Department.
    3. Saldarriaga-Isaza, Adrián & Arango, Santiago & Villegas-Palacio, Clara, 2015. "A behavioral model of collective action in artisanal and small-scale gold mining," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 98-109.
    4. Deng Ding & David Bennett & Silvia Secchi, 2015. "Investigating Impacts of Alternative Crop Market Scenarios on Land Use Change with an Agent-Based Model," Land, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 4(4), pages 1-28, November.
    5. Speelman, E.N. & García-Barrios, L.E. & Groot, J.C.J. & Tittonell, P., 2014. "Gaming for smallholder participation in the design of more sustainable agricultural landscapes," Agricultural Systems, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 62-75.
    6. Gerlie T. Tatlonghari & Zenaida M. Sumalde, 2008. "Formation of Social Capital for Common Pool Resource Management," Asian Journal of Agriculture and Development, Southeast Asian Regional Center for Graduate Study and Research in Agriculture (SEARCA), vol. 5(2), pages 21-40, December.
    7. Narloch, Ulf & Pascual, Unai & Drucker, Adam G., 2012. "Collective Action Dynamics under External Rewards: Experimental Insights from Andean Farming Communities," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 40(10), pages 2096-2107.
    8. Saldarriaga-Isaza, Adrián & Villegas-Palacio, Clara & Arango, Santiago, 2013. "The public good dilemma of a non-renewable common resource: A look at the facts of artisanal gold mining," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 224-232.
    9. d'Adda, Giovanna, 2011. "Motivation crowding in environmental protection: Evidence from an artefactual field experiment," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(11), pages 2083-2097, September.
    10. Neil Buckley & Stuart Mestelman & R. Andrew Muller & Stephen Schott & Jingjing Zhang, 2017. "Do the Number of Appropriators from the Commons Matter in Controlled Laboratory Environments?," Department of Economics Working Papers 2017-09, McMaster University.
    11. Feola, Giuseppe & Binder, Claudia R., 2010. "Towards an improved understanding of farmers' behaviour: The integrative agent-centred (IAC) framework," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(12), pages 2323-2333, October.
    12. Tatlonghari, Gerlie T. & Sumalde, Zenaida, 2. "Formation of Social Capital for Common Pool Resource Management," Asian Journal of Agriculture and Development, Southeast Asian Regional Center for Graduate Study and Research in Agriculture (SEARCA), vol. 5(2).
    13. Sophie Clot & Gilles Grolleau & Lisette Ibanez, 2014. "An experimental analysis from a taking game in Madagascar," Working Papers 14-02, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Jan 2014.
    14. Madani, Kaveh & Dinar, Ariel, 2012. "Non-cooperative institutions for sustainable common pool resource management: Application to groundwater," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 34-45.
    15. Anderies, John M. & Janssen, Marco A. & Bousquet, François & Cardenas, Juan-Camilo & Castillo, Daniel & Lopez, Maria-Claudio & Tobias, Robert & Vollan, Björn & Wutich, Amber, 2011. "The challenge of understanding decisions in experimental studies of common pool resource governance," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(9), pages 1571-1579, July.
    16. Song, Zhiyuan & Ouyang, Zhiyun & Xu, Weihua, 2012. "The role of fairness norms the household-based natural forest conservation: The case of Wolong, China," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 164-171.

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