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Design principles for managing coastal fisheries commons in present-day Japan

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  • Sarker, Ashutosh
  • Ikeda, Toru
  • Abe, Takaki
  • Inoue, Ken

Abstract

Ostrom (1990) challenged the traditional belief that commons management inevitably requires state ownership or privatization and instead established the notion of user self-governance. This notion, a third policy option for managing the commons, entails little or no state involvement. Under this notion, Ostrom developed eight design principles to which self-governing institutional arrangements adhere, while the role of the state is minimal. This article seeks to establish whether design principles characterize such institutional arrangements when the role of the state is accommodated explicitly within the principles. Drawing on a case study of present-day management of Japan's community-based coastal fisheries commons, our study shows that the design principles can better characterize self-governing institutional arrangements when the state adopts a pro-user self-governance role that provides strategic support for users, but neither takes ownership of the commons nor participates in engineering the institutional arrangements.

Suggested Citation

  • Sarker, Ashutosh & Ikeda, Toru & Abe, Takaki & Inoue, Ken, 2015. "Design principles for managing coastal fisheries commons in present-day Japan," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 32-38.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:117:y:2015:i:c:p:32-38
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2015.06.019
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Anne-Sarah Chiambretto & Hubert Stahn, 2017. "Voluntary Management of Fisheries under an Uncertain Background Legislative Threat," AMSE Working Papers 1712, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.
    2. Toshi H.Arimura & Shinji Kaneko & Shunsuke Managi & Takayoshi Shinkuma & Masashi Yamamoto & Yuichiro Yoshida, 2016. "Political Economy of Voluntary Approaches: A Lesson from Environmental Policies," Working Papers e107, Tokyo Center for Economic Research.
    3. Pri Perera & Risa Morimoto, 2019. "Poverty, institutions and environmental degradation: Fishing commons governance and the livelihood of rural households amid mangrove deforestation in Puttalam, Sri Lanka," Working Papers 229, Department of Economics, SOAS University of London, UK.
    4. Nguyen Thi Quynh, Chi & Schilizzi, Steven & Hailu, Atakelty & Iftekhar, Sayed, 2020. "Vietnam’s Territorial Use Rights for Fisheries: How do they perform against Ostrom’s institutional design principles?," World Development Perspectives, Elsevier, vol. 17(C).
    5. Ballal, Aabha & Guha, Asi & Tambe, Sandeep & Patnaik, Suprava & Joe, Elphin Tom, 2023. "Community forest legislation in India: Rights-based polycentrism or responsibilization?," World Development Perspectives, Elsevier, vol. 31(C).
    6. Å mid Hribar, Mateja & Hori, Keiko & Urbanc, Mimi & Saito, Osamu & Zorn, Matija, 2023. "Evolution and new potentials of landscape commons: Insights from Japan and Slovenia," Ecosystem Services, Elsevier, vol. 59(C).
    7. Arimura, Toshi H. & Kaneko, Shinji & Managi, Shunsuke & Shinkuma, Takayoshi & Yamamoto, Masashi & Yoshida, Yuichiro, 2019. "Political economy of voluntary approaches: A lesson from environmental policies in Japan," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 41-53.

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