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A Heuristic Evolutionary Game Theoretic Methodology for Conjunctive Use of Surface and Groundwater Resources

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  • Parna Parsapour-Moghaddam
  • Armaghan Abed-Elmdoust
  • Reza Kerachian

Abstract

In this paper, a methodology based on a new heuristic evolutionary game is developed to determine evolutionary stable equilibrium (ESE) strategies for conjunctive surface and groundwater allocation to water users with conflicting objectives. The methodology provides reasonable and realistic framework to illuminate non-cooperative behaviors of water users in the joint usage of surface and groundwater resources. The developed heuristic evolutionary game theoretic approach can be used for finding equilibrium in asymmetric n-person games with continuous strategies. The penalty function is provided in a way that it can control groundwater table drawdown at monitoring points. It is also shown that applying the proposed penalty function may inhibit the water users’ excessive exploitation and can consequently avoid the tragedy of commons. As the methodology needs to run water allocation optimization and groundwater simulation models for several times, an optimization model based on genetic algorithms is linked with MODFLOW groundwater simulation model. Furthermore, a computational cost reduction method has been used to reduce the computation time caused by several consecutive computational steps in the proposed methodology. A pistachio loss function due to the deficit irrigation is also developed and used for evaluating water users’ objective functions. To illustrate the practical utility of the methodology, it is applied to the Rafsanjan plain in Iran and it is shown that this approach can be used for developing surface and groundwater allocation policies. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

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  • Parna Parsapour-Moghaddam & Armaghan Abed-Elmdoust & Reza Kerachian, 2015. "A Heuristic Evolutionary Game Theoretic Methodology for Conjunctive Use of Surface and Groundwater Resources," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 29(11), pages 3905-3918, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:waterr:v:29:y:2015:i:11:p:3905-3918
    DOI: 10.1007/s11269-015-1035-6
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    2. Zhe Zhan & Anjing Fan, 2022. "How to Promote Quality and Equity of Early Childhood Education for Sustainable Development in Undeveloped Rural Areas of China: An Evolutionary Game Study," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(24), pages 1-16, December.
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    4. Yun Chen & Zhigen Hu & Quan Liu & Shu Chen, 2020. "Evolutionary Game Analysis of Tripartite Cooperation Strategy under Mixed Development Environment of Cascade Hydropower Stations," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 34(6), pages 1951-1970, April.
    5. C. Dai & Y. P. Cai & W. T. Lu & H. Liu & H. C. Guo, 2016. "Conjunctive Water Use Optimization for Watershed-Lake Water Distribution System under Uncertainty: a Case Study," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 30(12), pages 4429-4449, September.
    6. Nikolaos Nagkoulis & Konstantinos L. Katsifarakis, 2022. "Using Game Theory to Assign Groundwater Pumping Schedules," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 36(5), pages 1571-1586, March.
    7. Lalehzari, Reza & Kerachian, Reza, 2020. "Developing a framework for daily common pool groundwater allocation to demands in agricultural regions," Agricultural Water Management, Elsevier, vol. 241(C).
    8. Alireza Mojarabi-Kermani & Ehsan Shirangi & Amin Bordbar & Amir Abbas Kaman Bedast & Alireza Masjedi, 2019. "Stochastic Optimal Reservoir Operation Management, Applying Group Conflict Resolution Model," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 33(8), pages 2847-2865, June.
    9. Avinash Kumar Singh & Devendra Kumar Pathak & Sabyasachi Patra, 2023. "An integrated systems thinking approach for achieving sustainability in project‐based organizations," Systems Research and Behavioral Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(3), pages 501-535, May.
    10. Mohammad Reza Alizadeh & Mohammad Reza Nikoo & Gholam Reza Rakhshandehroo, 2017. "Developing a Multi-Objective Conflict-Resolution Model for Optimal Groundwater Management Based on Fallback Bargaining Models and Social Choice Rules: a Case Study," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 31(5), pages 1457-1472, March.

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