Selection bias and moral hazard in the Australian private health insurance market: Evidence from the Queensland skin cancer database
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1016/j.eap.2019.09.008
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Keane, Michael & Stavrunova, Olena, 2016.
"Adverse selection, moral hazard and the demand for Medigap insurance,"
Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 190(1), pages 62-78.
- Keane, M. & Stavrunova, O., 2010. "Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard and the Demand for Medigap Insurance," Health, Econometrics and Data Group (HEDG) Working Papers 10/14, HEDG, c/o Department of Economics, University of York.
- Michael Keane & Olena Stavrunova, 2011. "Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard and the Demand for Medigap Insurance," Working Papers 201119, ARC Centre of Excellence in Population Ageing Research (CEPAR), Australian School of Business, University of New South Wales.
- Michael P. Keane & Olean Stavrunova, 2014. "Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard and the Demand for Medigap Insurance," Economics Papers 2014-W02, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
- Michael Keane & Olena Stavrunova, 2011. "Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard and the Demand for Medigap Insurance," Working Paper Series 167, Finance Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney.
- Michael P. Keane & Olena Stavrunova, 2012. "Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard and the Demand for Medigap Insurance," Economics Papers 2012-W10, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002.
"On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(2), pages 444-460, April.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems," MPRA Paper 12531, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Jaap H. Abbring & Pierre-André Chiappori & Jean Pinquet, 2003.
"Moral Hazard and Dynamic Insurance Data,"
Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(4), pages 767-820, June.
- Jean Pinquet & Jaap Abbring & Pierre-André Chiappori, 2003. "Moral Hazard and Dynamic Insurance Data," Post-Print hal-00397121, HAL.
- Jaap H. Abbring & Pierre-Andre Chiappori, 2004. "Moral Hazard and Dynamic Insurance Data," 2004 Meeting Papers 316, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Buchmueller, Thomas C. & Fiebig, Denzil G. & Jones, Glenn & Savage, Elizabeth, 2013. "Preference heterogeneity and selection in private health insurance: The case of Australia," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(5), pages 757-767.
- Rachel J. Huang & Arthur Snow & Larry Y. Tzeng, 2017.
"Advantageous Selection in Insurance Markets with Compound Risk,"
The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, Springer;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 42(2), pages 171-192, September.
- Rachel J. Huang & Arthur Snow & Larry Y. Tzeng, 2017. "Advantageous Selection in Insurance Markets with Compound Risk," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 42(2), pages 171-192, September.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Kwame Adjei-Mantey & Charles Yuji Horioka, 2023.
"Determinants of health insurance enrollment and health expenditure in Ghana: an empirical analysis,"
Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 21(4), pages 1269-1288, December.
- Kwame Adjei-Mantey & Charles Yuji Horioka, 2022. "Determinants of Health Insurance Enrollment and Health Expenditure in Ghana: An Empirical Analysis," NBER Working Papers 30175, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Adjei-Mantey, Kwame & Horioka, Charles Yuji, 2022. "Determinants of health insurance enrollment and health expenditure in Ghana: An empirical analysis," AGI Working Paper Series 2022-04, Asian Growth Research Institute.
- Kwame Adjei-Mantey & Charles Yuji Horioka, 2022. "Determinants of Health Insurance Enrollment and Health Expenditure in Ghana: An Empirical Analysis," Discussion Paper Series DP2022-01, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
- Kwame Adjei-Mantey & Charles Yuji Horioka, 2022. "Determinants of health insurance enrollment and health expenditure in Ghana: An empirical analysis," ISER Discussion Paper 1165, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka.
- Zhao, Weimin & Chen, Na, 2024. "Does old-age security promote rural residents' consumption? A decomposition based on contribution and replacement rates," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 817-830.
- Peng Yang & Zhiping Chen, 2023. "Optimal Private Health Insurance Contract towards the Joint Interests of a Policyholder and an Insurer," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 11(10), pages 1-28, May.
- Lan Nguyen & Andrew C. Worthington, 2023. "Moral hazard in Australian private health insurance: the case of dental care services and extras cover," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 48(1), pages 157-176, January.
- Clifford Afoakwah & Joshua Byrnes & Paul Scuffham & Son Nghiem, 2023. "Testing for selection bias and moral hazard in private health insurance: Evidence from a mixed public‐private health system," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 32(1), pages 3-24, January.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Jiang, Yawen & Ni, Weiyi, 2020. "Impact of supplementary private health insurance on hospitalization and physical examination in China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
- Lan Nguyen & Andrew C. Worthington, 2023. "Moral hazard in Australian private health insurance: the case of dental care services and extras cover," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 48(1), pages 157-176, January.
- Powell, David & Goldman, Dana, 2021.
"Disentangling moral hazard and adverse selection in private health insurance,"
Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 222(1), pages 141-160.
- David Powell & Dana Goldman, 2016. "Disentangling Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in Private Health Insurance," NBER Working Papers 21858, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Xiaoqi Zhang & Yi Chen & Yi Yao, 2021. "Dynamic information asymmetry in micro health insurance: implications for sustainability," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 46(3), pages 468-507, July.
- Nathan Kettlewell, 2019.
"Utilization and Selection in an Ancillaries Health Insurance Market,"
Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 86(4), pages 989-1017, December.
- Nathan Kettlewell, 2016. "Utilisation and Selection in an Ancillaries Health Insurance Market," Discussion Papers 2016-17, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
- Ko, Hansoo, 2020. "Moral hazard effects of supplemental private health insurance in Korea," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 265(C).
- Jan Michael Bauer & Jörg Schiller & Christopher Schreckenberger, 2020. "Heterogeneous selection in the market for private supplemental dental insurance: evidence from Germany," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 59(1), pages 205-231, July.
- Clifford Afoakwah & Joshua Byrnes & Paul Scuffham & Son Nghiem, 2023. "Testing for selection bias and moral hazard in private health insurance: Evidence from a mixed public‐private health system," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 32(1), pages 3-24, January.
- Stephanie Rosenkranz & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2007.
"Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation?,"
Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 74(296), pages 573-585, November.
- Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2004. "Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation?," CEPR Discussion Papers 4263, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2006. "Can Coasean bargaining justify Pigouvian taxation?," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 7/2006, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
- Lau, Stephanie, 2011. "Investment incentives in bilateral trading," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 538-552.
- Hyojoung Kim & Doyoung Kim & Subin Im & James W. Hardin, 2009. "Evidence of Asymmetric Information in the Automobile Insurance Market: Dichotomous Versus Multinomial Measurement of Insurance Coverage," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 76(2), pages 343-366, June.
- Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005.
"Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions,"
RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(2), pages 318-336, Summer.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Allocating control in agency problems with limited liability and sequential hidden actions," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 27/2005, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions," CEPR Discussion Papers 5145, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Patrick W. Schmitz, 2006.
"Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 422-434, March.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Information Gathering, Transaction Costs and the Property Rights Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 5417, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Peter Zweifel & H. E. Frech, 2016.
"Why ‘Optimal’ Payment for Healthcare Providers Can Never be Optimal Under Community Rating,"
Applied Health Economics and Health Policy, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 9-20, February.
- Frech, Ted E & Zweifel, Peter, 2015. "Why ‘Optimal’ Payment for Healthcare Providers Can Never Be Optimal Under Community Rating," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt37b9q0k3, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
- Illoong Kwon, 2005.
"Threat of Dismissal: Incentive or Sorting?,"
Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(4), pages 797-838, October.
- Illoong Kwon, 2004. "Threat of Dismissal: Incentive or Sorting?," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 114, Econometric Society.
- Kwame Adjei-Mantey & Charles Yuji Horioka, 2023.
"Determinants of health insurance enrollment and health expenditure in Ghana: an empirical analysis,"
Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 21(4), pages 1269-1288, December.
- Adjei-Mantey, Kwame & Horioka, Charles Yuji, 2022. "Determinants of health insurance enrollment and health expenditure in Ghana: An empirical analysis," AGI Working Paper Series 2022-04, Asian Growth Research Institute.
- Kwame Adjei-Mantey & Charles Yuji Horioka, 2022. "Determinants of Health Insurance Enrollment and Health Expenditure in Ghana: An Empirical Analysis," NBER Working Papers 30175, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kwame Adjei-Mantey & Charles Yuji Horioka, 2022. "Determinants of Health Insurance Enrollment and Health Expenditure in Ghana: An Empirical Analysis," Discussion Paper Series DP2022-01, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
- Kwame Adjei-Mantey & Charles Yuji Horioka, 2022. "Determinants of health insurance enrollment and health expenditure in Ghana: An empirical analysis," ISER Discussion Paper 1165, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008.
"Information gathering and the hold-up problem in a complete contracting framework,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 101(3), pages 268-271, December.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Information Gathering and the Hold-Up Problem in a Complete Contracting Framework," CEPR Discussion Papers 6988, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Vasconcelos, Luís, 2014.
"Contractual signaling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 19-33.
- Luis Vasconcelos, 2006. "Contractual signalling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements," Nova SBE Working Paper Series wp495, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Nova School of Business and Economics.
- Shawn Cole & Xavier Gine & Jeremy Tobacman & Petia Topalova & Robert Townsend & James Vickery, 2013.
"Barriers to Household Risk Management: Evidence from India,"
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 104-135, January.
- Shawn Cole & Xavier Gine & Jeremy Tobacman & Petia Topalova & Robert M. Townsend & James Vickery, 2009. "Barriers to household risk management: evidence from India," Staff Reports 373, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
- Cole, Shawn & Gine, Xavier & Tobacman, Jeremy & Topalova, Petia & Townsend, Robert & Vickery, James, 2010. "Barriers to household risk management : evidence from India," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5504, The World Bank.
- Petia Topalova & Shawn Cole & Xavier Gene & Jeremy Tobacman & Robert Townsend & James Vickery, 2011. "Barriers to Household Risk Management: Evidence from India," Working Papers id:4293, eSocialSciences.
- Robert M. Townsend & Ms. Shawn Cole & Mr. Jeremy Tobacman & Mr. Xavier Gine & Mr. James Ian Vickery & Petia Topalova, 2012. "Barriers to Household Risk Management: Evidence from India," IMF Working Papers 2012/195, International Monetary Fund.
- Berger, Allen N. & Espinosa-Vega, Marco A. & Frame, W. Scott & Miller, Nathan H., 2011.
"Why do borrowers pledge collateral? New empirical evidence on the role of asymmetric information,"
Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 55-70, January.
- Allen N. Berger & Marco A. Espinosa-Vega & W. Scott Frame & Nathan H. Miller, 2007. "Why do borrowers pledge collateral? new empirical evidence on the role of asymmetric information," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2006-29, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
More about this item
Keywords
Moral hazard; Selection bias; Private health insurance; Qskin;All these keywords.
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecanpo:v:64:y:2019:i:c:p:259-265. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.journals.elsevier.com/economic-analysis-and-policy .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.