The evolution of free trade networks
This paper considers the evolutionary dynamics of a free trade agreement (FTA) network formation game among N countries. We first explore the static model introduced by Goyal and Joshi (2006) and precisely characterize the set of pairwise stable FTA networks. Then, we develop a dynamic model under random perturbations and identify long-run outcomes to remove prediction uncertainty inherited from static analysis. The results show that both partial free trade and global free trade will result when there are only three countries. However, when more countries are involved, only the complete FTA network emerges.
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