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Economic reform, voting, and local political intervention: Evidence from India

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  • Tandon, Sharad

Abstract

This paper uses the Indian tariff reforms of the early nineties to estimate how voters hurt by economic reforms respond. Regions more hurt by the tariff reform increased their support for both the party that initiated their suffering and parties with similar preferences in favor of poverty-centric policies. This response is surprisingly sophisticated, where voters did not simply punish incumbents for negative income shocks and correctly discounted initial anti-reform stances by opposition parties that later turned out to be false. Furthermore, the strength of this voting response varied with both geography and local political incentives, suggesting that the economic effects of reforms might vary substantially in large and decentralized democracies.

Suggested Citation

  • Tandon, Sharad, 2012. "Economic reform, voting, and local political intervention: Evidence from India," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 221-231.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:97:y:2012:i:2:p:221-231
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2011.05.004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Parag, Waknis, 2012. "Political economy of sub-national spending in India," MPRA Paper 36813, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Cassette, Aurélie & Farvaque, Etienne, 2016. "A dirty deed done dirt cheap: Reporting the blame of a national reform on local politicians," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 127-144.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Economic reform; Voting; Decentralization;

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • F1 - International Economics - - Trade
    • F5 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy

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