IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/corfin/v25y2014icp107-121.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Corporate tax aggressiveness, outside directors, and debt policy: An empirical analysis

Author

Listed:
  • Richardson, Grant
  • Lanis, Roman
  • Leung, Sidney Chi-Moon

Abstract

This study examines the influence of corporate tax aggressiveness on corporate debt policy (the debt-substitution effect) and the influence of outside directors on both debt and the debt-substitution effect. Based on a sample of 6967 firm-year observations over the 2001–2010 period, we find that tax aggressiveness is negatively correlated with debt. We also observe a negative correlation between debt and the proportion of outside directors on the board, and find that outside directors magnify the debt-substitution effect. Finally, we obtain similar results in analysis based on firms' debt issuance decisions.

Suggested Citation

  • Richardson, Grant & Lanis, Roman & Leung, Sidney Chi-Moon, 2014. "Corporate tax aggressiveness, outside directors, and debt policy: An empirical analysis," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 107-121.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:25:y:2014:i:c:p:107-121 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2013.11.010
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S092911991300117X
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Desai, Mihir A. & Dharmapala, Dhammika, 2006. "Corporate tax avoidance and high-powered incentives," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, pages 145-179.
    2. Chen, Shuping & Chen, Xia & Cheng, Qiang & Shevlin, Terry, 2010. "Are family firms more tax aggressive than non-family firms?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(1), pages 41-61, January.
    3. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, 1982. "Corporate Financial Structure and Managerial Incentives," NBER Chapters,in: The Economics of Information and Uncertainty, pages 107-140 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 323-329.
    5. MacKie-Mason, Jeffrey K, 1990. " Do Taxes Affect Corporate Financing Decisions?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(5), pages 1471-1493, December.
    6. Myers, Stewart C, 1984. " The Capital Structure Puzzle," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 39(3), pages 575-592, July.
    7. Titman, Sheridan & Wessels, Roberto, 1988. " The Determinants of Capital Structure Choice," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 43(1), pages 1-19, March.
    8. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-325, June.
    9. Tim Adam & Vidhan K. Goyal, 2008. "The Investment Opportunity Set And Its Proxy Variables," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 31(1), pages 41-63.
    10. Byrd, John W. & Hickman, Kent A., 1992. "Do outside directors monitor managers? *1: Evidence from tender offer bids," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 195-221, October.
    11. Xie, Biao & Davidson, Wallace III & DaDalt, Peter J., 2003. "Earnings management and corporate governance: the role of the board and the audit committee," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 295-316, June.
    12. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1990. " Capital Structure and the Informational Role of Debt," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(2), pages 321-349, June.
    13. Frank, Murray Z. & Goyal, Vidhan K., 2004. "The effect of market conditions on capital structure adjustment," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 47-55, March.
    14. Trezevant, Robert, 1992. " Debt Financing and Tax Status: Tests of the Substitution Effect and the Tax Exhaustion Hypothesis Using Firms' Responses to the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1557-1568, September.
    15. DeAngelo, Harry & Masulis, Ronald W., 1980. "Optimal capital structure under corporate and personal taxation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 3-29, March.
    16. Friend, Irwin & Lang, Larry H P, 1988. " An Empirical Test of the Impact of Managerial Self-interest on Corporate Capital Structure," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 43(2), pages 271-281, June.
    17. Bradley, Michael & Jarrell, Gregg A & Kim, E Han, 1984. " On the Existence of an Optimal Capital Structure: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 39(3), pages 857-878, July.
    18. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1991. " The Theory of Capital Structure," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 46(1), pages 297-355, March.
    19. Rajan, Raghuram & Winton, Andrew, 1995. " Covenants and Collateral as Incentives to Monitor," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 50(4), pages 1113-1146, September.
    20. Dammon, Robert M & Senbet, Lemma W, 1988. " The Effect of Taxes and Depreciation on Corporate Investment and Financial Leverage," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 43(2), pages 357-373, June.
    21. Murray Z. Frank & Vidhan K. Goyal, 2009. "Capital Structure Decisions: Which Factors Are Reliably Important?," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 38(1), pages 1-37, March.
    22. Eliezer M. Fich, 2005. "Are Some Outside Directors Better than Others? Evidence from Director Appointments by Fortune 1000 Firms," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(5), pages 1943-1972, September.
    23. Graham, John R. & Tucker, Alan L., 2006. "Tax shelters and corporate debt policy," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(3), pages 563-594, September.
    24. Grier, Paul & Zychowicz, Edward J., 1994. "Institutional investors, corporate discipline, and the role of debt," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, pages 1-11.
    25. Soku Byoun, 2008. "How and When Do Firms Adjust Their Capital Structures toward Targets?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 63(6), pages 3069-3096, December.
    26. John R. Graham, 2000. "How Big Are the Tax Benefits of Debt?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(5), pages 1901-1941, October.
    27. Stewart C. Myers, 1984. "Capital Structure Puzzle," NBER Working Papers 1393, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    28. Berger, Philip G & Ofek, Eli & Yermack, David L, 1997. " Managerial Entrenchment and Capital Structure Decisions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(4), pages 1411-1438, September.
    29. Eugene F. Fama, 2002. "Testing Trade-Off and Pecking Order Predictions About Dividends and Debt," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, pages 1-33.
    30. Coles, Jeffrey L. & Daniel, Naveen D. & Naveen, Lalitha, 2008. "Boards: Does one size fit all," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(2), pages 329-356, February.
    31. Mehran, Hamid, 1992. "Executive Incentive Plans, Corporate Control, and Capital Structure," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 27(04), pages 539-560, December.
    32. Rosenstein, Stuart & Wyatt, Jeffrey G., 1990. "Outside directors, board independence, and shareholder wealth," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 175-191, August.
    33. Sonja Olhoft Rego & Ryan Wilson, 2012. "Equity Risk Incentives and Corporate Tax Aggressiveness," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(3), pages 775-810, June.
    34. Graham, John R., 1996. "Debt and the marginal tax rate," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 41-73, May.
    35. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 1988. "The Determinants of Board Composition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, pages 589-606.
    36. Mitchell A. Petersen, 2009. "Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: Comparing Approaches," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, pages 435-480.
    37. Linck, James S. & Netter, Jeffry M. & Yang, Tina, 2008. "The determinants of board structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(2), pages 308-328, February.
    38. Myers, Stewart C., 1984. "Capital structure puzzle," Working papers 1548-84., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
    39. Eugene F. Fama, 2002. "Testing Trade-Off and Pecking Order Predictions About Dividends and Debt," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, pages 1-33.
    40. Healy, Paul M., 1985. "The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, pages 85-107.
    41. Anup Agrawal & Charles R. Knoeber, "undated". "Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders (Revision of 29-94)," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 8-96, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
    42. Chenchuramaiah T. Bathala & Kenneth P. Moon & Ramesh P. Rao, 1994. "Managerial Ownership, Debt Policy, and the Impact of Institutional Holdings: An Agency Perspective," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 23(3), Fall.
    43. Dahya, Jay & McConnell, John J., 2005. "Outside directors and corporate board decisions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-2), pages 37-60, March.
    44. Renée B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, 2007. "A Theory of Friendly Boards," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 62(1), pages 217-250, February.
    45. Sanjeev Bhojraj & Partha Sengupta, 2003. "Effect of Corporate Governance on Bond Ratings and Yields: The Role of Institutional Investors and Outside Directors," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76(3), pages 455-476, July.
    46. Armstrong, Christopher S. & Guay, Wayne R. & Weber, Joseph P., 2010. "The role of information and financial reporting in corporate governance and debt contracting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, pages 179-234.
    47. Agrawal, Anup & Knoeber, Charles R., 1996. "Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 31(03), pages 377-397, September.
    48. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1988. "Corporate control contests and capital structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 55-86, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Brooks, Chris & Godfrey, Chris & Hillenbrand, Carola & Money, Kevin, 2016. "Do investors care about corporate taxes?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, pages 218-248.
    2. Francis, Bill B. & Hasan, Iftekhar & Sun, Xian & Wu, Qiang, 2016. "CEO political preference and corporate tax sheltering," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, pages 37-53.
    3. Francis, Bill B. & Hasan, Iftekhar & Sun, Xian & Wu, Qiang, 2016. "CEO political preference and corporate tax sheltering," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, pages 37-53.
    4. Keasey, Kevin & Martinez, Beatriz & Pindado, Julio, 2015. "Young family firms: Financing decisions and the willingness to dilute control," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, pages 47-63.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corporate tax aggressiveness; Debt policy; Outside directors; Corporate governance;

    JEL classification:

    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:25:y:2014:i:c:p:107-121. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jcorpfin .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.