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Management compensation and earnings-based covenants as signaling devices in credit markets

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  • Levine, Carolyn B.
  • Hughes, John S.

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  • Levine, Carolyn B. & Hughes, John S., 2005. "Management compensation and earnings-based covenants as signaling devices in credit markets," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 11(5), pages 832-850, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:11:y:2005:i:5:p:832-850
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1985. "A Sequential Signalling Model of Convertible Debt Call Policy," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 40(5), pages 1263-1281, December.
    2. Mark Grinblatt & Chuan Yang Hwang, "undated". "Signalling and the Pricing of Unseasoned New Issues," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 1-89, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
    3. Dybvig, Philip H & Zender, Jaime F, 1991. "Capital Structure and Dividend Irrelevance with Asymmetric Information," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 4(1), pages 201-219.
    4. In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221.
    5. Chaim Fershtman & Kenneth L. Judd, 2006. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly: Corrigendum," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 1367-1367, September.
    6. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicholas S., 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 187-221, June.
    7. repec:bla:jfinan:v:44:y:1989:i:2:p:393-420 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Brennan, Michael J & Kraus, Alan, 1987. "Efficient Financing under Asymmetric Information," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 42(5), pages 1225-1243, December.
    9. Datar, Srikant M. & Feltham, Gerald A. & Hughes, John S., 1991. "The role of audits and audit quality in valuing new issues," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 3-49, March.
    10. Leland, Hayne E & Pyle, David H, 1977. "Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 32(2), pages 371-387, May.
    11. John G. Riley, 2001. "Silver Signals: Twenty-Five Years of Screening and Signaling," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(2), pages 432-478, June.
    12. Hughes, Patricia J., 1986. "Signalling by direct disclosure under asymmetric information," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 119-142, June.
    13. Miller, Merton H & Rock, Kevin, 1985. "Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 40(4), pages 1031-1051, September.
    14. Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L, 1987. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 927-940, December.
    15. repec:bla:jfinan:v:44:y:1989:i:2:p:421-49 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Ilia D. Dichev & Douglas J. Skinner, 2002. "Large–Sample Evidence on the Debt Covenant Hypothesis," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 40(4), pages 1091-1123, September.
    17. Michael Spence, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 87(3), pages 355-374.
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    Cited by:

    1. Fabrizio Zerbini, 2017. "CSR Initiatives as Market Signals: A Review and Research Agenda," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 146(1), pages 1-23, November.
    2. Jason Roderick Donaldson & Denis Gromb & Giorgia Piacentino, 2025. "Conflicting Priorities: A Theory of Covenants and Collateral," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 80(3), pages 1739-1768, June.
    3. Valeri V. Nikolaev, 2010. "Debt Covenants and Accounting Conservatism," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 48(1), pages 137-176, March.
    4. Wang, Jing, 2017. "Debt covenant design and creditor control rights: Evidence from the tightest covenant," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 331-352.
    5. Zhao, Jianmei & Barry, Peter J. & Katchova, Ani L., 2008. "Signaling Credit Risk in Agriculture: Implications for Capital Structure Analysis," Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Southern Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 40(3), pages 1-16, December.
    6. Steele C. West & Amin W. Mugera & Ross S. Kingwell, 2021. "Drivers of farm business capital structure and its speed of adjustment: evidence from Western Australia’s Wheatbelt," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 65(2), pages 391-412, April.
    7. Antonio E. Bernardo & Hongbin Cai & Jiang Luo, 2016. "Earnings vs. stock-price based incentives in managerial compensation contracts," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 316-348, March.
    8. Jing LI, 2013. "Accounting Conservatism and Debt Contracts: Efficient Liquidation and Covenant Renegotiation," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 30(3), pages 1082-1098, September.
    9. Stefan Wielenberg, 2009. "Ausschüttungsbegrenzung und liquidationsfinanzierte Ausschüttungen — wie sinnvoll ist vorsichtige Rechnungslegung?," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 61(1), pages 2-21, February.

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