IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/corfin/v11y2005i5p832-850.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Management compensation and earnings-based covenants as signaling devices in credit markets

Author

Listed:
  • Levine, Carolyn B.
  • Hughes, John S.

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Levine, Carolyn B. & Hughes, John S., 2005. "Management compensation and earnings-based covenants as signaling devices in credit markets," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 11(5), pages 832-850, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:11:y:2005:i:5:p:832-850
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0929-1199(05)00071-4
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1985. "A Sequential Signalling Model of Convertible Debt Call Policy," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 40(5), pages 1263-1281, December.
    2. Mark Grinblatt & Chuan Yang Hwang, "undated". "Signalling and the Pricing of Unseasoned New Issues," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 1-89, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
    3. Dybvig, Philip H & Zender, Jaime F, 1991. "Capital Structure and Dividend Irrelevance with Asymmetric Information," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 4(1), pages 201-219.
    4. In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221.
    5. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicholas S., 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 187-221, June.
    6. repec:bla:jfinan:v:44:y:1989:i:2:p:393-420 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, 1984. "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have InformationThat Investors Do Not Have," NBER Working Papers 1396, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Brennan, Michael J & Kraus, Alan, 1987. "Efficient Financing under Asymmetric Information," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 42(5), pages 1225-1243, December.
    9. Datar, Srikant M. & Feltham, Gerald A. & Hughes, John S., 1991. "The role of audits and audit quality in valuing new issues," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 3-49, March.
    10. Leland, Hayne E & Pyle, David H, 1977. "Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 32(2), pages 371-387, May.
    11. John G. Riley, 2001. "Silver Signals: Twenty-Five Years of Screening and Signaling," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(2), pages 432-478, June.
    12. Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L, 1987. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 927-940, December.
    13. Hughes, Patricia J., 1986. "Signalling by direct disclosure under asymmetric information," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 119-142, June.
    14. Miller, Merton H & Rock, Kevin, 1985. "Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 40(4), pages 1031-1051, September.
    15. repec:bla:jfinan:v:44:y:1989:i:2:p:421-49 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Ilia D. Dichev & Douglas J. Skinner, 2002. "Large–Sample Evidence on the Debt Covenant Hypothesis," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(4), pages 1091-1123, September.
    17. Michael Spence, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 87(3), pages 355-374.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Fabrizio Zerbini, 2017. "CSR Initiatives as Market Signals: A Review and Research Agenda," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 146(1), pages 1-23, November.
    2. Antonio E. Bernardo & Hongbin Cai & Jiang Luo, 2016. "Earnings vs. stock-price based incentives in managerial compensation contracts," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 316-348, March.
    3. Valeri V. Nikolaev, 2010. "Debt Covenants and Accounting Conservatism," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(1), pages 137-176, March.
    4. Wang, Jing, 2017. "Debt covenant design and creditor control rights: Evidence from the tightest covenant," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 331-352.
    5. Jing LI, 2013. "Accounting Conservatism and Debt Contracts: Efficient Liquidation and Covenant Renegotiation," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 30(3), pages 1082-1098, September.
    6. Stefan Wielenberg, 2009. "Ausschüttungsbegrenzung und liquidationsfinanzierte Ausschüttungen — wie sinnvoll ist vorsichtige Rechnungslegung?," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 61(1), pages 2-21, February.
    7. Jason Donaldson & Denis Gromb & Giorgia Piacentino, 2019. "Conflicting Priorities: A Theory of Covenants and Collateral," 2019 Meeting Papers 157, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    8. Zhao, Jianmei & Barry, Peter J. & Katchova, Ani L., 2008. "Signaling Credit Risk in Agriculture: Implications for Capital Structure Analysis," Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Southern Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 40(3), pages 1-16, December.
    9. Steele C. West & Amin W. Mugera & Ross S. Kingwell, 2021. "Drivers of farm business capital structure and its speed of adjustment: evidence from Western Australia’s Wheatbelt," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 65(2), pages 391-412, April.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Daniel Broxterman & Tingyu Zhou, 2023. "Information Frictions in Real Estate Markets: Recent Evidence and Issues," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 66(2), pages 203-298, February.
    2. Mike Burkart & Samuel Lee, 2016. "Smart Buyers," The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 5(2), pages 239-270.
    3. Anton Miglo, 2020. "Zero-Debt Policy under Asymmetric Information, Flexibility and Free Cash Flow Considerations," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 13(12), pages 1-25, November.
    4. S. Wong & Q. Wei & K. Chau, 2014. "IPO Location as a Quality Signal: The Case of Chinese Developers," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 49(4), pages 551-567, November.
    5. Andy Lardon & Marc Deloof, 2014. "Financial disclosure by SMEs listed on a semi-regulated market: evidence from the Euronext Free Market," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 361-385, February.
    6. Bernhardt, Dan & Koufopoulos, Kostas & Trigilia, Giulio, 2022. "Separating equilibria, underpricing and security design," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(3), pages 788-801.
    7. David B. Audretsch & Prashanth Mahagaonkar & Werner Bönte, 2009. "Financial Signaling by Innovative Nascent Entrepreneurs," Schumpeter Discussion Papers sdp09001, Universitätsbibliothek Wuppertal, University Library.
    8. Chahine, Salim & Mansi, Sattar & Mazboudi, Mohamad, 2015. "Media news and earnings management prior to equity offerings," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 177-195.
    9. Attar, Andrea & Mariotti, Thomas & Salanié, François, 2021. "Competitive Nonlinear Pricing under Adverse Selection," TSE Working Papers 21-1201, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Aug 2022.
    10. Su, Dongwei, 2004. "Leverage, insider ownership, and the underpricing of IPOs in China," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 37-54, February.
    11. Zhao, Jianmei & Katchova, Ani L. & Barry, Peter J., 2004. "Testing The Pecking Order Theory And The Signaling Theory For Farm Businesses," 2004 Annual meeting, August 1-4, Denver, CO 20215, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    12. Paula Hill, 2007. "Declared investment plans and IPO firm value," Applied Financial Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(1), pages 23-39.
    13. Kooyul Jung & Yong-Cheol Kim & Rene M. Stulz, 1994. "Investment Opportunities, Managerial Decisions, and the Security Issue Decision," NBER Working Papers 4907, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. John C. Persons, "undated". "Fully Revealing Equilibria with Suboptimal Investment," Research in Financial Economics 9507, Ohio State University.
    15. Fulghieri, Paolo & Hackbarth, Dirk & Garcia, Diego, 2015. "Asymmetric information, security design, and the pecking (dis)order," CEPR Discussion Papers 10660, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    16. Brendan Daley & Brett Green & Victoria Vanasco, 2016. "Designing securities for scrutiny," Economics Working Papers 1818, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Nov 2021.
    17. Mingcherng Deng & Nahum Melumad & Toshi Shibano, 2012. "Auditors’ Liability, Investments, and Capital Markets: A Potential Unintended Consequence of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(5), pages 1179-1215, December.
    18. Hartman-Glaser, Barney, 2017. "Reputation and signaling in asset sales," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 125(2), pages 245-265.
    19. Douglas Cumming, 2006. "Adverse Selection and Capital Structure: Evidence from Venture Capital," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 30(2), pages 155-183, March.
    20. Hayes, Rachel M. & Schaefer, Scott, 2009. "CEO pay and the Lake Wobegon Effect," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(2), pages 280-290, November.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:11:y:2005:i:5:p:832-850. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jcorpfin .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.