Incentive Compatibility and Differentiability: New Results and Classic Applications
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- Mailath, George J. & von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig, 2013. "Incentive compatibility and differentiability: New results and classic applications," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 1841-1861.
- Mailath, George J. & Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig von, 2013. "Incentive Compatibility and Differentiability New Results and Classic Applications," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 447, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
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Cited by:
- Weng, Xi & Wu, Fan & Yin, Xundong, 2023. "Linear Riley equilibria in quadratic signaling games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
- Jiwoong Lee & Rudolf Müller & Dries Vermeulen, 2019.
"Separating equilibrium in quasi-linear signaling games,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(4), pages 1033-1054, December.
- Lee, J. & Müller, R.J. & Vermeulen, A.J., 2014. "Separating equilibrium in quasi-linear signaling games," Research Memorandum 026, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
- Lisa M. Scheele & Ulrich W. Thonemann & Marco Slikker, 2018. "Designing Incentive Systems for Truthful Forecast Information Sharing Within a Firm," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(8), pages 3690-3713, August.
- Ryo Ishida & Takuro Miyamoto, 2014. "Does an Optimal Voluntary Approach Flexibly and Efficiently Control Emissions from Heterogeneous Firms?," Discussion papers ron257, Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance Japan.
- Mike Burkart & Samuel Lee, 2016.
"Smart Buyers,"
The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 5(2), pages 239-270.
- Mike Burkart & Samuel Lee, 2012. "Smart Buyers," FMG Discussion Papers dp696, Financial Markets Group.
- Burkart, Mike & Lee, Samuel, 2012. "Smart Buyers," CEPR Discussion Papers 8774, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Burkart, Mike & Lee, Samuel, 2012. "Smart buyers," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 119056, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Burkart, Mike & Lee, Samuel, 2016. "Smart buyers," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 69537, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Junjie Zhou & Ying-Ju Chen, 2016. "Targeted Information Release in Social Networks," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 64(3), pages 721-735, June.
- Christopher Gedge & James W. Roberts & Andrew Sweeting, 2014. "A Model of Dynamic Limit Pricing with an Application to the Airline Industry," NBER Working Papers 20293, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Lu, Zhuoran, 2025. "Selling signals," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 224(C).
- Fuhai HONG & Xiaojian ZHAO, 2014. "Sunk Cost as a Self-Disciplining Device," Economic Growth Centre Working Paper Series 1503, Nanyang Technological University, School of Social Sciences, Economic Growth Centre.
- Andrew M. Davis & Elena Katok & Anthony M. Kwasnica, 2014. "Should Sellers Prefer Auctions? A Laboratory Comparison of Auctions and Sequential Mechanisms," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 60(4), pages 990-1008, April.
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Keywords
; ; ; ;JEL classification:
- C60 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - General
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CTA-2010-10-23 (Contract Theory and Applications)
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