Incentive Compatibility and Differentiability: New Results and Classic Applications
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- Mailath, George J. & von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig, 2013. "Incentive compatibility and differentiability: New results and classic applications," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 1841-1861.
- Mailath, George J. & Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig von, 2013. "Incentive Compatibility and Differentiability New Results and Classic Applications," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 447, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
KeywordsAdverse selection; separation; differentiable strategies; incentive-compatibility;
- C60 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - General
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
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