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Permissible collateral and access to finance: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment

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  • Xu, Bing

Abstract

By allowing large classes of movable assets to be used as collateral, the Property Law reform transformed the secured transactions in China. Difference-in-differences tests show firms operating with ex-ante more movable assets expand access to bank credit and prolong debt maturity. However, the reform does not seem to improve the efficiency of credit allocation, as debt capacity of ex-ante low quality firms expands the most following the reform. Credit expansion also does not lead to better firm performance. These findings are not driven by confounding factors such as improvements in creditor and property rights protection. Our results also cannot be explained by other important reforms which were introduced around the same time as the introduction of the Property Law. These include anti-tunneling and split-share reforms and amendments to the corporate tax structure in China. We conduct explicit robustness tests for these other reforms and hence contribute to the empirical literature on the reform process in China with new findings.

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  • Xu, Bing, 2019. "Permissible collateral and access to finance: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 237-255.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:chieco:v:54:y:2019:i:c:p:237-255
    DOI: 10.1016/j.chieco.2018.11.006
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Collateral; Movable assets; Leverage; Property law; China;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law

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