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Does corporate governance matter in China?

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  • Cheung, Yan-Leung
  • Jiang, Ping
  • LIMPAPHAYOM, Piman
  • Lu, Tong

Abstract

This study assesses the quality of corporate governance practices of Chinese listed companies in 2004. Based on the Revised OECD Principles of Corporate Governance [OECD, 2004. Principles of Corporate Governance, Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development.], we develop a corporate governance index (CGI) to measure the overall quality of corporate governance and disclosure practices of the 100 largest Chinese listed firms. The results show that some Chinese companies have been making progress in corporate governance reform. Specifically, there is a significant difference in the CGI of the top versus the bottom performing companies. Further, oversea-listed Chinese companies tend to show more regard for the role of stakeholders and disclosure and transparency than non-oversea-listed Chinese companies. However, further tests show that there is no statistically significant relation between the quality of corporate governance practices, as measured by the CGI, and market valuation among firms in the sample. It appears that, in 2004, the benefits of good corporate governance have not been fully incorporated into the market valuation of these Chinese companies.

Suggested Citation

  • Cheung, Yan-Leung & Jiang, Ping & LIMPAPHAYOM, Piman & Lu, Tong, 2008. "Does corporate governance matter in China?," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 460-479, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:chieco:v:19:y:2008:i:3:p:460-479
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    Cited by:

    1. Xu, Hongmei, 2015. "Corporate governance, state ownership and cross-listing: Evidence from Chinese A-share listed firms," Discussion Papers of the Institute for Organisational Economics 2/2015, University of Münster, Institute for Organisational Economics.
    2. Yu, Mei & Ashton, John K., 2015. "Board leadership structure for Chinese public listed companies," China Economic Review, Elsevier, pages 236-248.
    3. Mishra, Anil V. & Ratti, Ronald A., 2011. "Governance, monitoring and foreign investment in Chinese companies," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, pages 171-188.
    4. Beck, Günter & Wieland, Volker, 2009. "Money in monetary policy design: Monetary cross-checking in the New-Keynesian model," CEPR Discussion Papers 7518, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Gabe J. de Bondt & Tuomas A. Peltonen & Daniel Santabárbara, 2010. "Booms and busts in China's stock market: Estimates based on fundamentals," Working Papers 1032, Banco de España;Working Papers Homepage.
    6. Cheung, Yan-leung & OUYANG, Zhiwei & TAN, Weiqiang, 2009. "How regulatory changes affect IPO underpricing in China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 692-702, December.
    7. Teng Lin & Marion Hutchinson & Majella Percy, 2015. "Earnings management and the role of the audit committee: an investigation of the influence of cross-listing and government officials on the audit committee," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 19(1), pages 197-227, February.
    8. Cheung, Yan-Leung & Chung, Cheong-Wing & Tan, Weiqiang & Wang, Wenming, 2013. "Connected board of directors: A blessing or a curse?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(8), pages 3227-3242.
    9. Abdallah, Abed Al-Nasser & Ismail, Ahmad K., 2017. "Corporate governance practices, ownership structure, and corporate performance in the GCC countries," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, pages 98-115.
    10. He, Yan & Chiu, Yung-ho & Zhang, Bin, 2015. "The impact of corporate governance on state-owned and non-state-owned firms efficiency in China," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, pages 252-277.
    11. Battaglia, Francesca & Gallo, Angela, 2015. "Risk governance and Asian bank performance: An empirical investigation over the financial crisis," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, pages 53-68.
    12. Haß, Lars Helge & Vergauwe, Skrålan & Zhang, Qiyu, 2014. "Corporate governance and the information environment: Evidence from Chinese stock markets," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, pages 106-119.
    13. Gabe de Bondt & Tuomas Peltonen & Daniel Santabarbara, 2011. "Booms and busts in China's stock market: estimates based on fundamentals," Applied Financial Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, pages 287-300.

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