Fiscal Policy with Impure Intergenerational Altruism
Recent work demonstrates that dynastic assumptions guarantee the irrelevance of redistributional policies, distortionary taxes, and prices--the neutrality of fiscal policy (Ricardian equivalence) is only the "tip of the iceberg." This paper investigates the possibility of reinstating approximate Ricardian equivalence by introducing a small amount of friction in intergenerational links. If Ricardian equivalence depends upon significantly shorter chains of links than do these stronger neutrality results, then friction may dissipate the effects that generate strong neutrality, without significantly affecting the Ricardian result. However, models with friction have other untenable implications and, thus, the theoretical case for Ricardian equivalence remains tenuous. Copyright 1991 by The Econometric Society.
Volume (Year): 59 (1991)
Issue (Month): 6 (November)
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- Andreoni, James, 1990. "Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 100(401), pages 464-77, June.
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