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Two-sided platforms, heterogeneous tastes, and coordination

Author

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  • Shun Tsukamoto

    (Graduate School of Economics, Nagoya University)

Abstract

This paper studies duopolistic price competition in a two-sided market with positive and negative indirect network externalities on both sides. I develop a model in which the externality is positive for some agents and negative for the others on each side. The paper shows that (i) a platform in equilibrium attracts a larger number of agents on both sides if the proportion of agents who incur a negative externality is small and (ii) each platform in equilibrium obtains a larger market share on one side and a lower market share on the other side if the proportion is large. Social welfare is not maximized in these equilibria because the platform with the lower market share on each side attracts too many agents in the former case while each platform attracts too many agents on the side with a lower market share in the latter case.

Suggested Citation

  • Shun Tsukamoto, 2020. "Two-sided platforms, heterogeneous tastes, and coordination," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 40(1), pages 388-406.
  • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-19-00129
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, 2003. "Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(4), pages 990-1029, June.
    2. E. Glen Weyl, 2010. "A Price Theory of Multi-sided Platforms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1642-1672, September.
    3. Sokullu, Senay, 2016. "Network effects in the German magazine industry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 77-79.
    4. Jean-Charles Rochet Author-Email:rochet@cict.fr Author-Workplace-Name: IDEI, University of Toulouse & Jean Tirole Author-Email: tirole@cict.fr Author-Workplace-Name: IDEI, University of Toulouse, 2006. "Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 37(3), pages 645-667, Autumn.
    5. Jean‐Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, 2006. "Two‐sided markets: a progress report," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(3), pages 645-667, September.
    6. GABSZEWICZ, Jean & WAUTHY, Xavier, 2004. "Two-sided markets and price competition with multi-homing," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2004030, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    7. Senay Sokullu, 2016. "A Semi‐Parametric Analysis of Two‐Sided Markets: An Application to the Local Daily Newspapers in the USA," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 31(5), pages 843-864, August.
    8. Ying Fan, 2013. "Ownership Consolidation and Product Characteristics: A Study of the US Daily Newspaper Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(5), pages 1598-1628, August.
    9. Mark Armstrong Author-Email: mark.armstrong@ucl.ac.uk Author-Workplace-Name: University College of London, 2006. "Competition in Two-Sided Markets," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 37(3), pages 668-691, Autumn.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Two-Sided Platform; Negative Indirect Network Externality; Horizontal Differentiation; Coordination;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies

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