Vertical integration through Rubinstein bargaining
We consider a vertical structure in which an upstream manufacturer bargains with a downstream retailer over the price of an intermediate good. In an alternating offers framework, we show that when the managers of the firms can choose their response time in the negotiation that the solution conforms either to the non-intergrated or fully integrated structure from standard models of successive monopoly.
Volume (Year): 32 (2012)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Sakovics Jozsef, 1993. "Delay in Bargaining Games with Complete Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 78-95, February.
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"Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
- repec:cup:cbooks:9780521576475 is not listed on IDEAS
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"Wage bargaining with on-the-job search: theory and evidence,"
150201, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, France.
- Pierre Cahuc & Fabien Postel-Vinay & Jean-Marc Robin, 2006. "Wage Bargaining with On-the-Job Search: Theory and Evidence," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(2), pages 323-364, 03.
- Pierre Cahuc & Fabien Postel-Vinay & Jean-Marc Robin, 2006. "Wage bargaining with on-the-job search: theory and evidence," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/dc0ckec3fcb, Sciences Po.
- Pierre Cahuc & Fabien Postel-Vinay & Jean-Marc Robin, 2003. "Wage bargaining with on-the-job search : theory and evidence," Research Unit Working Papers 0212, Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquee, INRA.
- Cahuc, Pierre & Postel-Vinay, Fabien & Robin, Jean-Marc, 2003. "Wage Bargaining with On-The-Job Search: Theory and Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 4154, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Hoel, Michael, 1986. " Perfect Equilibria in Sequential Bargaining Games with Nonlinear Utility Functions," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 88(2), pages 383-400.
- Admati, Anat R & Perry, Motty, 1987. "Strategic Delay in Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(3), pages 345-64, July.
- Cramton, Peter C, 1992.
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Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(1), pages 205-25, January.
- Peter Cramton, 1992. "Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty," Papers of Peter Cramton 92res, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998.
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