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Aktive Wettbewerbspolitik für effiziente Elektrizitätserzeugungsmärkte: Instrumente, internationale Erfahrungen und wirtschaftspolitische Schlussfolgerungen

Listed author(s):
  • Christian von Hirschhausen
  • Hannes Weigt

The liberalization of European wholesale electricity markets has made some progress, but much is left to be desired. Wholesale prices are still relatively high, when compared with the competitive benchmark. In this paper, we argue that an active competition policy is required to establish competitive wholesale markets and to achieve lower prices. The instruments of an active competition policy are: horizontal divestiture of generation capacities; the auctioning of virtual power generation capacities; the release of long-term contracts of the incumbents; extending the capacities on crossborder electricity lines; vertical unbundling; and an active support of market entry. International experience suggests the important role of active competition policy in electricity markets: prominent examples come from England and the United States. Continental Europe has also started to experiment with the different instruments to strengthen competition. The paper draws conclusions for energy and competition policy. Trotz schrittweiser Erfolge bei der Liberalisierung der europäischen Elektrizitätsmärkte lässt die Wettbewerbsintensität auf den Großhandelsmärkten in vielen Ländern noch zu wünschen übrig. Dementsprechend sind die Preise im Verhältnis zum wettbewerblichen Referenzmaßstab zu hoch. Eine aktive Wettbewerbspolitik sollte integraler Bestandteil einer odnungspolitisch ausgerichteten Wirtschafts- und Energiepolitik sein - mit dem Ziel, wettbewerbliche Elektrizitätsmärkte und geringere Preise zu erreichen. Instrumente einer aktiven Wettbewerbspolitik im engeren Sinne sind u.a. die Abspaltung bestehender Kraftwerkskapazitäten von marktbeherrschenden Unternehmen (Divestiture), der Verkauf von virtuellen Kraftwerkskapazitäten, die Öffnung von Langfristverträgen alteingesessener Unternehmen (Release), die Steigerung der nutzbaren Kuppelkapazitäten, u.U. auch die vertikale Entflechtung sowie die aktive Förderung von Markeintritt. Internationale Erfahrungen belegen, dass aktive Wettbewerbspolitik eine wichtige Rolle bei der Schaffung wettbewerblicher Elektrizitätsmärkte spielt. Dies ist insbesondere in England und den USA beobachtbar, jedoch sind in jüngerer Zeit auch in Kontinentaleuropa Ansätze aktiver Wettbewerbspolitik zu beobachten. Der Aufsatz schließt mit energie- und wettbewerbspolitischen Empfehlungen.

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Article provided by DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research in its journal Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung.

Volume (Year): 76 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 65-86

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Handle: RePEc:diw:diwvjh:76-1-6
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  1. Saal, David S & Parker, David, 2001. "Productivity and Price Performance in the Privatized Water and Sewerage Companies of England and Wales," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 61-90, July.
  2. Carl Blumstein & Lee Friedman & Richard Green, 2002. "The History of Electricity Restructuring in California," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 9-38, June.
  3. Green, Richard J & Newbery, David M, 1992. "Competition in the British Electricity Spot Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(5), pages 929-953, October.
  4. Crampes , C. & Fabra , N., 2005. "The Spanish Electricity Industry: Plus ça change …," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0502, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  5. Stephen Littlechild, 2007. "Beyond regulation," Chapters,in: Utility Regulation in Competitive Markets, chapter 1 Edward Elgar Publishing.
  6. Kumkar, Lars, 2002. "Das kalifornische Strommarktdebakel: von Liberalisierungsversprechen und Regulierungsversagen," Kiel Working Papers 1097, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
  7. Villalonga, Belen, 2000. "Privatization and efficiency: differentiating ownership effects from political, organizational, and dynamic effects," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 43-74, May.
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