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Structure de propriété et communication financière des entreprises françaises

  • Réal Labelle

    (HEC Montréal)

  • Alain Schatt


    (Université de Strasbourg 3)

(VF)Cette étude empirique a pour objet de vérifier s’il existe une relation entre la structure de propriété et la qualité de la communication financière des entreprises françaises. Nos résultats indiquent que la relation entre la dilution de l’actionnariat et la qualité des relations avec les investisseurs n’est pas linéaire mais curvilinéaire.(VA)The objective of this empirical study is to test the hypothesized relation between ownership structure and the quality of financial reporting of French firms. The results confirm that the relation between shareholding dilution and the quality of investors’ relations is not linear but curvilinear.

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Article provided by in its journal Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie.

Volume (Year): 8 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 77-104

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Handle: RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:8:y:2005:i:q3:p:77-104
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