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Les stratégies comptables précédant un changement de dirigeant en France

Author

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  • Yves Mard

    () (Université de Clermont)

  • Sylvain Marsat

    (Université de Clermont)

Abstract

(VF)À partir d'un échantillon de 56 changements de dirigeant au sein d'entreprises françaises cotées entre 2000 et 2005, la nature et les facteurs explicatifs des choix comptables effectués par le dirigeant sortant sont analysés. L'étude des accruals discrétionnaires montre que les dirigeants sortants ont tendance à gérer à la hausse les résultats durant les deux exercices qui précèdent leur départ. Par ailleurs, les dirigeants sortants détenteurs de stock-options sont incités à gérer les résultats à la hausse. L'âge du dirigeant est aussi associé positivement au montant des accruals. En revanche, les dirigeants restant au sein de l'entreprise comme administrateur adoptent une politique comptable moins agressive.(VA)From a sample of 56 French firms which encountered a change of their CEO during the 2000-2005 period, we analyze the nature and the determinants of accounting choices carried out by the outgoing top manager. The study of discretionary accruals shows that managers engaged in upwards earnings management during the two years preceding their departure. Besides, the outgoing CEO who benefits from stock options is more prone to upgrade results. The age of the manager is also positively correlated with discretionary accruals. Conversely, a top manager who stays on the board of directors implements less aggressivc accounting choices.

Suggested Citation

  • Yves Mard & Sylvain Marsat, 2008. "Les stratégies comptables précédant un changement de dirigeant en France," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 11(4), pages 111-136, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:11:y:2008:i:q4:p:111-136
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    Cited by:

    1. Dubocage, Emmanuelle & Galindo, Géraldine, 2014. "Understanding founder–CEO’s replacement in venture-backed companies: A theoretical and empirical analysis," European Management Journal, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 461-474.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    changements de dirigeant; gestion du résultat; gouvernance d'entreprise; choix comptables; CEO changes; earnings management; corporate governance; accounting choices.;

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting

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