IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Les stratégies comptables entourant un changement de dirigeant en France

  • Yves Mard

    (Centre de Recherches Clermontois en Gestion et Management (CRCGM) - Université d'Auvergne - Clermont-Ferrand I)

  • Sylvain Marsat

    (Centre de Recherches Clermontois en Gestion et Management (CRCGM) - Université d'Auvergne - Clermont-Ferrand I)

Registered author(s):

    À partir d'un échantillon de 52 changements de dirigeants au sein d'entreprises françaises cotées entre 2000 et 2005, les choix comptables effectués par les dirigeants sortants et entrants sont analysés. L'étude des accruals discrétionnaires montre d'abord que les dirigeants sortants ont tendance à gérer à la hausse les résultats durant les deux exercices qui précèdent leur départ. Ensuite, on observe une baisse très nette des accruals durant l'exercice de succession, conformément à l'hypothèse du « big bath ». Enfin, durant l'exercice qui suit le changement, la gestion du résultat à la hausse est constatée en cas de changement planifié du dirigeant, mais pas dans le cas d'un départ forcé.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/52/54/27/PDF/p44.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number halshs-00525427.

    as
    in new window

    Length:
    Date of creation: May 2008
    Date of revision:
    Publication status: Published - Presented, LA COMPTABILITE, LE CONTRÔLE ET L'AUDIT ENTRE CHANGEMENT ET STABILITE, 2008, France
    Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00525427
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00525427/en/
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as in new window
    1. Farrell, Kathleen A. & Whidbee, David A., 2003. "Impact of firm performance expectations on CEO turnover and replacement decisions," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(1-3), pages 165-196, December.
    2. Dechow, Patricia M. & Sloan, Richard G., 1991. "Executive incentives and the horizon problem : An empirical investigation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 51-89, March.
    3. Weisbach, Michael S., 1988. "Outside directors and CEO turnover," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 431-460, January.
    4. Pourciau, Susan, 1993. "Earnings management and nonroutine executive changes," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1-3), pages 317-336, April.
    5. Murphy, Kevin J. & Zimmerman, Jerold L., 1993. "Financial performance surrounding CEO turnover," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1-3), pages 273-315, April.
    6. Engel, Ellen & Hayes, Rachel M. & Wang, Xue, 2003. "CEO turnover and properties of accounting information," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(1-3), pages 197-226, December.
    7. Warner, Jerold B. & Watts, Ross L. & Wruck, Karen H., 1988. "Stock prices and top management changes," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 461-492, January.
    8. Jayne Godfrey & Paul Mather & Alan Ramsay, 2003. "Earnings and Impression Management in Financial Reports: The Case of CEO Changes," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 39(1), pages 95-123.
    9. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 1996. "Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their Monitoring of the CEO," Microeconomics 9602001, EconWPA, revised 09 Oct 1996.
    10. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00525427. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.