IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

Contrat de crédit, décentralisation décisionnelle et performance des institutions de microfinance

Author Info

Listed author(s):
  • Hubert Tchakoute Tchuigoua

    ()

    (BEM-Bordeaux Management School)

Abstract

(VF)L’objectif de cet article est de vérifier empiriquement la relation entre les types de contrat de crédit, l’architecture organisationnelle et la performance des institutions de microfinance. L’économétrie des données de panel permet d’étudier un échantillon de 114 institutions de microfinance sur la période 2001- 2006. Les résultats montrent que l’architecture organisationnelle n’a pas d’influence significative sur les trois dimensions de la performance. Les contrats mixtes ont un effet négatif et significatif sur la rentabilité économique, mais permettent aux institutions de microfinance d’atteindre un nombre important d’emprunteurs. Enfin, les contrats de crédit de groupe jouent un rôle très important dans leur qualité de portefeuille.(VA)This article aims to produce evidence on the relationship between lending contracts, organizational architecture and the performance of microfinance institutions. We analyze panel data for a sample of 114 MFIs during the period stretching from 2001 to 2006. The results show that organizational architecture has no significant influence on the three dimensions of performance. Mixed contracts have a negative and significant effect on the rate of economic returns, but allow the concerned organizations to reach large numbers of borrowers. Finally, joint liability contracts tend to improve the portfolio quality of microfinance institutions.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://crego.u-bourgogne.fr/images/stories/rev/142173.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Article provided by revues.org in its journal Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie.

Volume (Year): 14 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 143-173

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:14:y:2011:i:q2:p:143-173
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.revues.org/

Order Information: Email:


Keywords: Architecture organisationnelle; microfinance; qualité de portefeuille; performance; réseau; organizational architecture; microfinance; portfolio quality; performance; network.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

  • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
  • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
  • G39 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Other

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as
in new window


  1. Joanna Ledgerwood & Victoria White, 2006. "Transforming Microfinance Institutions : Providing Full Financial Services to the Poor," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 7086, July.
  2. Berger, Allen N. & Klapper, Leora F. & Udell, Gregory F., 2001. "The ability of banks to lend to informationally opaque small businesses," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(12), pages 2127-2167, December.
  3. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-325, June.
  4. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Agency Problems and Residual Claims," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 327-349, June.
  5. Hartarska, Valentina M., 2005. "Governance and Performance of Microfinance Institutions in Central and Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States," 2005 International Congress, August 23-27, 2005, Copenhagen, Denmark 24568, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
  6. Chowdhury, Prabal Roy, 2005. "Group-lending: Sequential financing, lender monitoring and joint liability," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 415-439, August.
  7. Ghatak, Maitreesh, 1999. "Group lending, local information and peer selection," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 27-50, October.
  8. Mersland, Roy & Øystein Strøm, R., 2009. "Performance and governance in microfinance institutions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(4), pages 662-669, April.
  9. Martin Desrochers & Klaus P. Fischer, 2005. "The Power of Networks: Integration and Financial Cooperative Performance," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 76(3), pages 307-354, 09.
  10. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 2003. "Collusion and group lending with adverse selection," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 329-348, April.
  11. Navajas, Sergio & Schreiner, Mark & Meyer, Richard L. & Gonzalez-vega, Claudio & Rodriguez-meza, Jorge, 2000. "Microcredit and the Poorest of the Poor: Theory and Evidence from Bolivia," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 333-346, February.
  12. Hartarska, Valentina, 2005. "Governance and performance of microfinance institutions in Central and Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 33(10), pages 1627-1643, October.
  13. Berger, Allen N. & Miller, Nathan H. & Petersen, Mitchell A. & Rajan, Raghuram G. & Stein, Jeremy C., 2005. "Does function follow organizational form? Evidence from the lending practices of large and small banks," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 237-269, May.
  14. Alessandra Cassar & Luke Crowley & Bruce Wydick, 2007. "The effect of social capital on group loan repayment: evidence from field experiments," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(517), pages 85-106, 02.
  15. Berger, Allen N & Udell, Gregory F, 1995. "Relationship Lending and Lines of Credit in Small Firm Finance," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 68(3), pages 351-381, July.
  16. Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, 2002. "Small Business Credit Availability and Relationship Lending: The Importance of Bank Organisational Structure," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(477), pages 32-53, February.
  17. DeanS. Karlan, 2007. "Social connections and group banking," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(517), pages 52-84, 02.
  18. Beatriz Armendáriz de Aghion & Jonathan Morduch, 2000. "Microfinance Beyond Group Lending," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 8(2), pages 401-420, July.
  19. repec:idb:brikps:78868 is not listed on IDEAS
  20. Christian Ahlin & RobertM. Townsend, 2007. "Using Repayment Data to Test Across Models of Joint Liability Lending," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(517), pages 11-51, 02.
  21. Roy Mersland & Reidar Øystein Strøm, 2008. "Performance and trade-offs in Microfinance Organisations-does ownership matter?," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 20(5), pages 598-612.
  22. Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1990. "Peer Monitoring and Credit Markets," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 4(3), pages 351-366, September.
  23. Brickley, James A. & Linck, James S. & Smith, Clifford Jr., 2003. "Boundaries of the firm: evidence from the banking industry," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 351-383, December.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

The CitEc project has not yet found citations to this item.

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Access and download statistics

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:14:y:2011:i:q2:p:143-173. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Gérard Charreaux)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.