IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Managing correlated stock externalities: water taxes with a pinch of salt

  • LEGRAS, SOPHIE

This paper addresses the design of corrective taxation schemes to manage multiple, interacting stocks. In the setting of irrigation-induced salinity, a collective groundwater stock aliments a set of individual rootzone salt stocks. It is shown that the policy maker does not need to base the tax rule on the individual salt stocks. Indeed, taxes based on the level of input and on the collective stock induce the agents to achieve the socially optimal irrigation path. An even simpler instrument is sufficient if the policy-maker's goal is to reach optimality at the steady state only.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S1355770X10000021
File Function: link to article abstract page
Download Restriction: no

Article provided by Cambridge University Press in its journal Environment and Development Economics.

Volume (Year): 15 (2010)
Issue (Month): 03 (June)
Pages: 275-292

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:cup:endeec:v:15:y:2010:i:03:p:275-292_00
Contact details of provider: Postal: Cambridge University Press, UPH, Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8BS UK
Web page: http://journals.cambridge.org/jid_EDE
Email:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Hassan Benchekroun & Ngo Van Long, 1997. "Efficiency Inducing Taxation for Polluting Oligopolists," CIRANO Working Papers 97s-21, CIRANO.
  2. Arthur Caplan, 2006. "A Comparison of Emission Taxes and Permit Markets for Controlling Correlated Externalities," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 34(4), pages 471-492, August.
  3. Moslener, Ulf & Requate, Till, 2005. "Optimal Abatement in Dynamic Multipollutant Problems when Pollutants can be Complements or Substitutes," Economics Working Papers 2005,03, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics.
  4. Arthur Caplan & Emilson Silva, 2002. "An Efficient Mechanism to Control Correlated Externalities: Redistributive Transfers and the Coexistence of Regional and Global Pollution Permit Markets," Working Papers 2002-23, Utah State University, Department of Economics.
  5. Horan, Richard D. & Shortle, James S. & Abler, David G., 1998. "Ambient Taxes When Polluters Have Multiple Choices," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 186-199, September.
  6. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521637329 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. Karp, Larry & Livernois, John, 1992. "On efficiency-inducing taxation for a non-renewable resource monopolist," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 219-239, November.
  8. Moslener, Ulf & Requate, Till, 2009. "The dynamics of optimal abatement strategies for multiple pollutants--An illustration in the Greenhouse," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(5), pages 1521-1534, March.
  9. Ragozin, David L. & Brown, Gardner Jr., 1985. "Harvest policies and nonmarket valuation in a predator -- prey system," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 155-168, June.
  10. Wichelns, Dennis, 1999. "An economic model of waterlogging and salinization in arid regions," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 475-491, September.
  11. Yang, Zili, 2006. "Negatively correlated local and global stock externalities: tax or subsidy?," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 11(03), pages 301-316, June.
  12. Scott Barrett, 2008. "The Incredible Economics of Geoengineering," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 39(1), pages 45-54, January.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cup:endeec:v:15:y:2010:i:03:p:275-292_00. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Keith Waters)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.