IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cup/endeec/v15y2010i03p275-292_00.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Managing correlated stock externalities: water taxes with a pinch of salt

Author

Listed:
  • LEGRAS, SOPHIE

Abstract

This paper addresses the design of corrective taxation schemes to manage multiple, interacting stocks. In the setting of irrigation-induced salinity, a collective groundwater stock aliments a set of individual rootzone salt stocks. It is shown that the policy maker does not need to base the tax rule on the individual salt stocks. Indeed, taxes based on the level of input and on the collective stock induce the agents to achieve the socially optimal irrigation path. An even simpler instrument is sufficient if the policy-maker's goal is to reach optimality at the steady state only.

Suggested Citation

  • Legras, Sophie, 2010. "Managing correlated stock externalities: water taxes with a pinch of salt," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 15(03), pages 275-292, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:endeec:v:15:y:2010:i:03:p:275-292_00
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S1355770X10000021
    File Function: link to article abstract page
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Benchekroun, Hassan & van Long, Ngo, 1998. "Efficiency inducing taxation for polluting oligopolists," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 325-342, November.
    2. Moslener, Ulf & Requate, Till, 2009. "The dynamics of optimal abatement strategies for multiple pollutants--An illustration in the Greenhouse," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(5), pages 1521-1534, March.
    3. Moslener, Ulf & Requate, Till, 2007. "Optimal abatement in dynamic multi-pollutant problems when pollutants can be complements or substitutes," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 31(7), pages 2293-2316, July.
    4. Arthur Caplan, 2006. "A Comparison of Emission Taxes and Permit Markets for Controlling Correlated Externalities," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 34(4), pages 471-492, August.
    5. Ragozin, David L. & Brown, Gardner Jr., 1985. "Harvest policies and nonmarket valuation in a predator -- prey system," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 155-168, June.
    6. Scott Barrett, 2008. "The Incredible Economics of Geoengineering," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 39(1), pages 45-54, January.
    7. Horan, Richard D. & Shortle, James S. & Abler, David G., 1998. "Ambient Taxes When Polluters Have Multiple Choices," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 186-199, September.
    8. Dockner,Engelbert J. & Jorgensen,Steffen & Long,Ngo Van & Sorger,Gerhard, 2000. "Differential Games in Economics and Management Science," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521637329.
    9. Caplan, Arthur J. & Silva, Emilson C.D., 2005. "An efficient mechanism to control correlated externalities: redistributive transfers and the coexistence of regional and global pollution permit markets," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 68-82, January.
    10. Karp, Larry & Livernois, John, 1992. "On efficiency-inducing taxation for a non-renewable resource monopolist," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 219-239, November.
    11. Yang, Zili, 2006. "Negatively correlated local and global stock externalities: tax or subsidy?," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 11(03), pages 301-316, June.
    12. Wichelns, Dennis, 1999. "An economic model of waterlogging and salinization in arid regions," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 475-491, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Denis Claude & Charles Figuières & Mabel Tidball, 2012. "Regulation of Investments in Infrastructure: The Interplay between Strategic Behaviors and Initial Endowments," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 14(1), pages 35-66, February.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cup:endeec:v:15:y:2010:i:03:p:275-292_00. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Keith Waters). General contact details of provider: http://journals.cambridge.org/jid_EDE .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.