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Governance Codes: Facts Or Fictions? A Study Of Governance Codes In Colombia

Author

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  • JULIÁN BENAVIDES FRANCO*
  • SAMUEL MONGRUT MONTALVÁN

Abstract

This article studies the effects on accounting performance and financing decisions of Colombian firms after issuing a corporate governance code. We assemble a database of Colombian issuers and test the hypotheses of improved performance and higher leverage after issuing a code. The results show that the firms´ return on assets after the code introduction improves in excess of 1%; the effect is amplified by the code quality. Additionally, the firms leverage increased, in excess of 5%, when the code quality was factored into the analysis. These results suggest that controlling parties commitment to self restrain, by reducing their private benefits and/or the expropriation of non controlling parties, through the code introduction, is indeed an effective measure and that the financial markets agree, increasing the supply of funds to the firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Julián Benavides Franco* & Samuel Mongrut Montalván, 2010. "Governance Codes: Facts Or Fictions? A Study Of Governance Codes In Colombia," Estudios Gerenciales, Universidad Icesi, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:col:000129:008473
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Carlos Pombo & Luis H. Gutiérrez, 2007. "Corporate Governance and Firm Valuation in Colombia," Research Department Publications 4470, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    2. Marek Gruszczynski, 2006. "Corporate Governance and Financial Performance of Companies in Poland," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 12(2), pages 251-259, May.
    3. Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-329, May.
    4. Andrés Langebaek & Jaime Eduardo Ortíz, 2007. "Q De Tobin Y Gobierno Corporativo De Las Empresas Listadas En Bolsa," Borradores de Economia 3960, Banco de la Republica.
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    Cited by:

    1. Manuel E. Núñez Izquierdo & Josep Garcia‐Blandon & Christopher F. Baum, 2021. "Evaluating the impact of compliance with governance recommendations on firm performance: The case of Spain," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(3), pages 3788-3806, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corporate governance; governance codes; agency theory; accounting performance; leverage.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • M48 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law

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