IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/clr/wugarc/y2011v37i1p51.html

Makroökonomische Politik zur Bewältigung der Krise im Euroraum: Die Rolle Deutschlands

Author

Listed:
  • Silke Tober

Abstract

Die EZB und die deutsche Fiskalpolitik haben auf die Wirtschafts- und Finanzkrise zwar zögerlich reagiert, aber entscheidend zur wirtschaftlichen Stabilisierung beigetragen. Bisher lässt sich ein solches Urteil über die wirtschaftspolitische Reaktion, insbesondere Deutschlands, auf die Staatsanleihenkrise nicht fällen. Auch ein Jahr nach Beginn der Krise ist die Lage im Euroraum prekär. Um die Märkte zu beruhigen und Kettenreaktionen zu verhindern, ist eine Garantie der ausstehenden Staatsanleihen der Krisenländer erforderlich. Niedrig verzinste, an Vorgaben gebundene Notfallkredite erscheinen ebenfalls unumgänglich. Diese Notmaßnahmen sollten ab 2013 sukzessive durch Eurobonds abgelöst werden. Sorgen Länder wie Deutschland für ein expansives konjunkturelles Klima und werden dabei von der EZB unterstützt, ermöglicht dies den Krisenländern, sowohl ihre Staatsfinanzen zu konsolidieren als auch ihre Leistungsbilanz zu verbessern. Statt einer destabilisierenden Gläubigerhaftung bei Staatsanleihen und automatischen Sanktionen bei Nichteinhaltung der fiskalischen Kriterien benötigt der Euroraum institutionelle Rahmenbedingungen, die eine frühzeitige Reaktion auf makroökonomische Ungleichgewichte gewährleisten und damit die Situation einer drohenden Zahlungsunfähigkeit einzelner Länder gar nicht erst entstehen lassen.

Suggested Citation

  • Silke Tober, 2011. "Makroökonomische Politik zur Bewältigung der Krise im Euroraum: Die Rolle Deutschlands," Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft - WuG, Kammer für Arbeiter und Angestellte für Wien, Abteilung Wirtschaftswissenschaft und Statistik, vol. 37(1), pages 51-68.
  • Handle: RePEc:clr:wugarc:y:2011v:37i:1p:51
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://emedien.arbeiterkammer.at/viewer/pdf/AC08890876_2011_001/wug_2011_37_1_0051.pdf
    File Function: PDF-file of article
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gustav A. Horn & Silke Tober, 2007. "Wie stark kann die deutsche Wirtschaft wachsen?," IMK Report 17-2007, IMK at the Hans Boeckler Foundation, Macroeconomic Policy Institute.
    2. Jacques Delpla & Jakob von Weizsäcker, 2010. "The Blue Bond Proposal," Bruegel Policy Brief 403, Bruegel.
    3. Silke Tober & Tobias Zimmermann, 2009. "Monetary policy and commodity price shocks," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics;Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), vol. 44(4), pages 231-237, July.
    4. Gustav A. Horn & Torsten Niechoj & Silke Tober & Till van Treeck & Achim Truger, 2010. "Reform des Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakts: Nicht nur öffentliche, auch private Verschuldung zählt," IMK Report 51-2010, IMK at the Hans Boeckler Foundation, Macroeconomic Policy Institute.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. repec:clr:wugarc:y:2011:v:37i:1p:51 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Gustav A. Horn & Fabian Lindner & Silke Tober & Andrew Watt, 2012. "Where now for the euro area crisis? Interim assessment and a model for a stable euro area," IMK Report 75e-2012, IMK at the Hans Boeckler Foundation, Macroeconomic Policy Institute.
    3. Gustav A. Horn & Fabian Lindner & Silke Tober & Andrew Watt, 2012. "Quo vadis Krise? Zwischenbilanz und Konzept für einen stabilen Euroraum," IMK Report 75-2012, IMK at the Hans Boeckler Foundation, Macroeconomic Policy Institute.
    4. repec:clr:wugarc:y:2011:v:37i:2p:233 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Bruno Rossmann, 2011. "Die neue europäische Steuerungsarchitektur - "More of the same" statt Paradigmenwechsel," Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft - WuG, Kammer für Arbeiter und Angestellte für Wien, Abteilung Wirtschaftswissenschaft und Statistik, vol. 37(2), pages 233-268.
    6. Gustav A. Horn & Heike Joebges & Lothar Kamp & Alexandra Krieger & Sebastian Sick & Silke Tober, 2009. "Gesamtwirtschaftliche Stabilität durch bessere Regulierung - Vorschläge für eine Neuordnung der Finanzmärkte," IMK Report 36-2009, IMK at the Hans Boeckler Foundation, Macroeconomic Policy Institute.
    7. Sebastian Blesse & Pierre C Boyer & Friedrich Heinemann & Eckhard Janeba & Anasuya Raj, 2019. "European Monetary Union reform preferences of French and German parliamentarians," European Union Politics, , vol. 20(3), pages 406-424, September.
    8. Daniel Dăianu, 2012. "EURO zone crisis and EU governance: Tackling a flawed design and inadequate policy arrangements," Acta Oeconomica, Akadémiai Kiadó, Hungary, vol. 62(3), pages 295-319, September.
    9. repec:dau:papers:123456789/12010 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Corsetti, Giancarlo & Dedola, Luca & Jarociński, Marek & Maćkowiak, Bartosz & Schmidt, Sebastian, 2019. "Macroeconomic stabilization, monetary-fiscal interactions, and Europe's monetary union," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 22-33.
    11. Markus K. Brunnermeier & Sam Langfield & Marco Pagano & Ricardo Reis & Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh & Dimitri Vayanos, 2017. "ESBies: safety in the tranches," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 32(90), pages 175-219.
    12. Giovanni Dosi & Marcello Minenna & Andrea Roventini & Roberto Violi, 2021. "Making the Eurozone work: a risk-sharing reform of the European Stability Mechanism," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 299(1), pages 617-657, April.
    13. Fabrizio Balassone & Sara Cecchetti & Martina Cecioni & Marika Cioffi & Wanda Cornacchia & Flavia Corneli & Gabriele Semeraro, 2018. "Economic governance in the euro area: balancing risk reduction and risk sharing," Chapters, in: Giuseppe Eusepi & Richard E. Wagner (ed.), Debt Default and Democracy, chapter 7, pages 124-154, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    14. Kämmerer Jörn Axel, 2016. "How Can Eurobonds Be Legally Implemented into European Law?," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(3), pages 585-604, November.
    15. Massimo Amato & Everardo Belloni & Paolo Falbo & Lucio Gobbi, 2021. "Europe, public debts, and safe assets: the scope for a European Debt Agency," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 38(3), pages 823-861, October.
    16. Carmelo Pierpaolo Parello & Vincenzo Visco, 2012. "The European Redemption Fund: A Comparison of Two Proposals," Politica economica, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 3, pages 273-306.
    17. Beetsma, Roel & Mavromatis, Kostas, 2014. "An analysis of eurobonds," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 91-111.
    18. Catherine Mathieu & Henri Sterdyniak, 2011. "Finances publiques, sorties de crise…," Sciences Po Economics Publications (main) hal-03460493, HAL.
    19. Rey, Hélène & Gourinchas, Pierre-Olivier, 2016. "Real Interest Rates, Imbalances and the Curse of Regional Safe Asset Providers at the Zero Lower Bound," CEPR Discussion Papers 11503, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    20. Schilirò, Daniele, 2016. "Rules, Imbalances and Growth in the Eurozone," MPRA Paper 75641, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    21. Keuschnigg, Christian, 2012. "Welche Finanz- und Wirtschaftspolitik braucht Europa?," Economics Working Paper Series 1201, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.
    22. Paul De Grauwe, 2014. "The Governance of a Fragile Eurozone," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Exchange Rates and Global Financial Policies, chapter 12, pages 297-320, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    23. Fabrizio Balassone & Sara Cecchetti & Martina Cecioni & Marika Cioffi & Wanda Cornacchia & Flavia Corneli & Gabriele Semeraro, 2016. "Risk Reduction and Risk Sharing in the Governance of the Euro Area," Politica economica, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 3, pages 463-488.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:clr:wugarc:y:2011v:37i:1p:51. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sepp Zuckerstaetter (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/awakwat.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.