IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bpj/rmeecf/v7y2011i2n4.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Ownership Concentration, Choice of Auditors, and Firm Performance: Evidence from the MENA Region

Author

Listed:
  • Farooq Omar

    (Al Akhawayn University)

  • El Kacemi Youssef

    (Al Akhawayn University)

Abstract

Using a large dataset of ownership concentration from the MENA region during the period between 2004 and 2008, we document that ownership concentration does not have a significant impact on firm performance. It is, rather, the way concentrated firms govern themselves that determine their performance. We argue that concentrated ownership firms, being aware of the agency problems embedded in their ownership structure, appoint one of the big-four auditors as their external auditor to signal to the market that they are disclosing reliable information. Our results also show a significantly positive relationship between ownership concentration and the choice of auditor. We further show that for a given level of ownership concentration, appointing one of the big-four auditors leads to superior firm performance.

Suggested Citation

  • Farooq Omar & El Kacemi Youssef, 2011. "Ownership Concentration, Choice of Auditors, and Firm Performance: Evidence from the MENA Region," Review of Middle East Economics and Finance, De Gruyter, vol. 7(2), pages 1-17, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:rmeecf:v:7:y:2011:i:2:n:4
    DOI: 10.2202/1475-3693.1303
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.2202/1475-3693.1303
    Download Restriction: For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.2202/1475-3693.1303?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mike Burkart & Fausto Panunzi & Andrei Shleifer, 2003. "Family Firms," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(5), pages 2167-2201, October.
    2. Pradeep K. Chhibber & Sumit K. Majumdar, 1998. "Does it pay to venture abroad? Exporting behavior and the performance of firms in Indian industry," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 19(2), pages 121-126.
    3. Julia Sawicki, 2009. "Corporate governance and dividend policy in Southeast Asia pre- and post-crisis," The European Journal of Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(2), pages 211-230.
    4. Mckinley, S & Pany, K & Reckers, Pmj, 1985. "An Examination Of The Influence Of Cpa Firm Type, Size, And Mas Provision On Loan Officer Decisions And Perceptions," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(2), pages 887-896.
    5. Andrew McLennan & In-Uck Park, 2016. "The market for liars: Reputation and auditor honesty," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 12(1), pages 49-66, March.
    6. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1986. "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 461-488, June.
    7. Joseph P. H. Fan & T.J. Wong, 2001. "Do External Auditors Perform a Corporate Governance Role in Emerging Markets? Evidence from East Asia," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 400, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    8. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez‐De‐Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 1999. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(2), pages 471-517, April.
    9. Jeremy C. Stein, 1989. "Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 104(4), pages 655-669.
    10. Leuz, Christian & Nanda, Dhananjay & Wysocki, Peter D., 2003. "Earnings management and investor protection: an international comparison," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 505-527, September.
    11. Jayati Sarkar & Subrata Sarkar, 2000. "Large Shareholder Activism in Corporate Governance in Developing Countries: Evidence from India," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 1(3), pages 161-194, September.
    12. Ronald C. Anderson & David M. Reeb, 2003. "Founding-Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(3), pages 1301-1327, June.
    13. Claessens, Stijn & Djankov, Simeon & Lang, Larry H. P., 2000. "The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1-2), pages 81-112.
    14. Ronald C. Anderson & David M. Reeb, 2003. "Founding‐Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(3), pages 1301-1328, June.
    15. Morck, Randall K. (ed.), 2000. "Concentrated Corporate Ownership," National Bureau of Economic Research Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226536781, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Farooq Omar & Tabine Sonia, 2015. "Agency Problems and the Choice of Auditors: Evidence from the MENA Region," Review of Middle East Economics and Finance, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 79-97, April.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Hamadi, Malika & Heinen, Andréas, 2015. "Firm performance when ownership is very concentrated: Evidence from a semiparametric panel," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 172-194.
    2. Bouzgarrou, Houssam & Navatte, Patrick, 2013. "Ownership structure and acquirers performance: Family vs. non-family firms," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 123-134.
    3. Bennedsen, Morten & Nielsen, Kasper & Pérez-González, Francisco & Wolfenzon, Daniel, 2005. "Inside the Family Firm," Working Papers 21-2005, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics.
    4. Morck, Randall & Deniz Yavuz, M. & Yeung, Bernard, 2011. "Banking system control, capital allocation, and economy performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 264-283, May.
    5. San Martin-Reyna, J.M. & Duran-Encalada, Jorge A., 2012. "The relationship among family business, corporate governance and firm performance: Evidence from the Mexican stock exchange," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 106-117.
    6. Anderson, Ronald C. & Duru, Augustine & Reeb, David M., 2009. "Founders, heirs, and corporate opacity in the United States," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(2), pages 205-222, May.
    7. González, Maximiliano & Guzmán, Alexander & Pombo, Carlos & Trujillo, María-Andrea, 2012. "Family firms and financial performance: The cost of growing," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 626-649.
    8. Stepanov, Sergey & Suvorov, Anton, 2017. "Agency problem and ownership structure: Outside blockholder as a signal," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 87-107.
    9. Bennedsen, Morten & Fan, Joseph P.H. & Jian, Ming & Yeh, Yin-Hua, 2015. "The family business map: Framework, selective survey, and evidence from Chinese family firm succession," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 212-226.
    10. Mike Peng & Yi Jiang, 2006. "Family Ownership And Control In Large Firms: The Good, The Bad, The Irrelevant ??? And Why," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp840, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    11. Mauricio Jara-Bertin & Jean P. Sepulveda, 2014. "Earnings Management and Performance in Family-Controlled Firms:Evidence from an Emerging Economy," Serie Working Papers 01, Universidad del Desarrollo, School of Business and Economics, revised Nov 2014.
    12. Jang, Hasung & Kang, Hyung-cheol & Park, Kyung Suh, 2005. "Determinants of Family Ownership: The Choice between Control and Performance," CEI Working Paper Series 2005-5, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    13. Adhikari, Hari P. & Sutton, Ninon K., 2016. "All in the family: The effect of family ownership on acquisition performance," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 65-78.
    14. Sumon Kumar Bhaumik & Andros Gregoriou, 2010. "‘Family’ Ownership, Tunnelling And Earnings Management: A Review Of The Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(4), pages 705-730, September.
    15. Razzaque, Rushdi Md. Rezaur & Ali, Muhammad Jahangir & Mather, Paul R., 2016. "Real earnings management in family firms: Evidence from an emerging economy," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 40(PB), pages 237-250.
    16. Konstantin Kosenko, 2007. "Evolution of Business Groups in Israel: Their Impact at the Level of the Firm and the Economy," Israel Economic Review, Bank of Israel, vol. 5(2), pages 55-93.
    17. Polsiri, Piruna & Jiraporn, Pornsit, 2012. "Political connections, ownership structure, and financial institution failure," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 39-53.
    18. Ansari, Iram Fatima & Goergen, Marc & Mira, Svetlana, 2014. "The determinants of the CEO successor choice in family firms," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 6-25.
    19. Villalonga, Belen & Amit, Raphael, 2006. "How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 385-417, May.
    20. Saito, Takuji, 2008. "Family firms and firm performance: Evidence from Japan," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 620-646, December.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:rmeecf:v:7:y:2011:i:2:n:4. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peter Golla (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.degruyter.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.