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Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization War: Ideology and Beliefs, Indivisibles and Time Preferences

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  • Gries Thomas

    (Paderborn University, Warburger Strasse 100, 33098 Paderborn, Germany)

  • Haake Claus-Jochen

    (Paderborn University, Warburger Strasse 100, 33098 Paderborn, Germany)

Abstract

In this note we focus on the particularly long duration of civil armed conflicts. We argue that if conflict parties have extreme ideological beliefs or follow an “irrevocable religious or ideological truth,” there could be three elements in the preference order that may imply a long duration of the conflict. More precise, preference orders of conflict parties are multidimensional. If (1) one dimension is a set of rules that defines an irrevocable ideology and or religious beliefs, and (2) is a necessary element in the preference order, and (3) due to elements of their beliefs – time preference is low, the conflict may have a long duration. For insurgents motivated by such strong beliefs it is essential that their set of rules is established, not when.

Suggested Citation

  • Gries Thomas & Haake Claus-Jochen, 2016. "Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization War: Ideology and Beliefs, Indivisibles and Time Preferences," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 22(4), pages 377-384, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:pepspp:v:22:y:2016:i:4:p:377-384:n:13
    DOI: 10.1515/peps-2016-0042
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    References listed on IDEAS

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