Bessere europäische Wettbewerbspolitik durch den „more economic approach“ ? Einige Fragezeichen nach den ersten Erfahrungen / Does the more economic approach lead to a better competition policy? Some question marks after the first experiences
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DOI: 10.1515/ordo-2007-0105
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- Schmidt André, 2008. "Ordnungsökonomische Wettbewerbskonzepte: Die Wettbewerbspolitik im Spannungsfeld zwischen Freiheit und Effizienz / Order Economic Concepts of Competition: Competition Policy between Economic Freedom a," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 59(1), pages 209-236, January.
- Schmidtchen Dieter, 2008. "Wettbewerbsfreiheit oder Effizienz? / Freedom for competition or efficiency?: Zur Zweisamkeit von Recht und Ökonomie im Bereich der Wettbewerbspolitik," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 59(1), pages 143-184, January.
- Christiansen Arndt, 2013. "Recht, Ordnung und Wettbewerb: Besprechung der gleichnamigen Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag von Wernhard Möschel," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 64(1), pages 500-508, January.
- Christiansen Arndt, 2011. "Entscheidungen zum Europäischen Kartellrecht: Zu der gleichnamigen von Jörg Karenfort und Andreas Weitbrecht herausgegebenen Entscheidungssammlung," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 62(1), pages 566-573, January.
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