IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bpj/bejeap/v18y2018i1p14n1.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Performance, Luck and Equality: An Experimental Analysis of Subjects’ Preferences for Different Allocation Criteria

Author

Listed:
  • Becchetti Leonardo
  • Solferino Nazaria

    (Department of Economics Law and Institutions, University of Rome Tor Vergata, Via Columbia 2, 00133, Roma, Italy)

  • Antoni Giacomo Degli

    (Department of Law, Politics and International Studies, University of Parma, via Università 12, 43121Parma, Italy)

  • Ottone Stefania

    (Econometica, Inter-University Center for Economic Ethics and Corporate Social Responsibility, via Bicocca degli Arcimboldi 8, 20126Milano, Italy)

Abstract

We perform an experimental analysis to investigate participants’ choices of allocative criteria under different conditions. We document that performance-based criteria guaranteeing a minimal egalitarian base are widely preferred by both neutral spectators and stakeholders without information on relative payoffs, although popularity among stakeholders is mostly due to self-interest considerations and optimism concerning their expected performance. Information regarding the distribution of payoffs under different criteria dramatically reduces such choice because the self-interest motive directly emerges, and most players opt to revise their decision in favor of the criterion maximizing their own payoff.

Suggested Citation

  • Becchetti Leonardo & Solferino Nazaria & Antoni Giacomo Degli & Ottone Stefania, 2018. "Performance, Luck and Equality: An Experimental Analysis of Subjects’ Preferences for Different Allocation Criteria," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 18(1), pages 1-14, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:18:y:2018:i:1:p:14:n:1
    DOI: 10.1515/bejeap-2016-0259
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2016-0259
    Download Restriction: For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1515/bejeap-2016-0259?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hoffman Elizabeth & McCabe Kevin & Shachat Keith & Smith Vernon, 1994. "Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 346-380, November.
    2. Grzegorz Lissowski & Tadeusz Tyszka & Wlodzimierz Okrasa, 1991. "Principles of Distributive Justice," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 35(1), pages 98-119, March.
    3. Gary E Bolton & Axel Ockenfels, 2008. "Risk Taking and Social Comparison - A Comment on “Betrayal Aversion: Evidence from Brazil, China, Oman, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Statesâ€," Working Paper Series in Economics 40, University of Cologne, Department of Economics.
    4. Becchetti, Leonardo & Degli Antoni, Giacomo & Ottone, Stefania & Solferino, Nazaria, 2013. "Allocation criteria under task performance: The gendered preference for protection," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 96-111.
    5. Huck, Steffen & Weizsacker, Georg, 2002. "Do players correctly estimate what others do? : Evidence of conservatism in beliefs," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 71-85, January.
    6. Ruben Durante & Louis Putterman & Joël Weele, 2014. "Preferences For Redistribution And Perception Of Fairness: An Experimental Study," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 1059-1086, August.
    7. Corneo, Giacomo & Gruner, Hans Peter, 2002. "Individual preferences for political redistribution," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(1), pages 83-107, January.
    8. John Bone & Paolo Crosetto & John D Hey & Carmen Pasca, 2013. "Chance versus choice: eliciting attitudes to fair compensations," Discussion Papers 13/15, Department of Economics, University of York.
    9. James Konow, 2003. "Which Is the Fairest One of All? A Positive Analysis of Justice Theories," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(4), pages 1188-1239, December.
    10. Theo Offerman & Joep Sonnemans & Gijs Van De Kuilen & Peter P. Wakker, 2009. "A Truth Serum for Non-Bayesians: Correcting Proper Scoring Rules for Risk Attitudes ," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 76(4), pages 1461-1489.
    11. Ruffle, Bradley J., 1998. "More Is Better, But Fair Is Fair: Tipping in Dictator and Ultimatum Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 247-265, May.
    12. F. Carlsson & G. Gupta & O. Johansson-Stenman, 2003. "Choosing from behind a veil of ignorance in India," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(13), pages 825-827.
    13. Stefania Ottone & Ferruccio Ponzano & Giulia Andrighetto, 2015. "Tax Compliance Under Different Institutional Settings in the EU: An Experimental Analysis," Working Papers 307, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2015.
    14. Konow, James, 1996. "A positive theory of economic fairness," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 13-35, October.
    15. Sandroni Alvaro & Ludwig Sandra & Kircher Philipp, 2013. "On the Difference between Social and Private Goods," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(1), pages 1-27, June.
    16. Kagel, John H. & Kim, Chung & Moser, Donald, 1996. "Fairness in Ultimatum Games with Asymmetric Information and Asymmetric Payoffs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 100-110, March.
    17. Linda Babcock & Xianghong Wang & George Loewenstein, 1996. "Choosing the Wrong Pond: Social Comparisons in Negotiations That Reflect a Self-Serving Bias," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 111(1), pages 1-19.
    18. Krawczyk, Michal, 2010. "A glimpse through the veil of ignorance: Equality of opportunity and support for redistribution," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(1-2), pages 131-141, February.
    19. Björn Bartling & Urs Fischbacher, 2012. "Shifting the Blame: On Delegation and Responsibility," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 79(1), pages 67-87.
    20. Marlies Ahlert & Katja Funke & Lars Schwettmann, 2013. "Thresholds, productivity, and context: an experimental study on determinants of distributive behaviour," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(4), pages 957-984, April.
    21. Forsythe Robert & Horowitz Joel L. & Savin N. E. & Sefton Martin, 1994. "Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 347-369, May.
    22. Olof Johansson-Stenman & Fredrik Carlsson & Dinky Daruvala, 2002. "Measuring Future Grandparents" Preferences for Equality and Relative Standing," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(479), pages 362-383, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Beraldo, Sergio & Piacenza, Massimiliano & Turati, Gilberto, 2022. "The importance of the future when deciding levels of personal responsibility and demand for redistribution," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 116(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Leonardo Becchetti & Giacomo Degli Antoni & Stefania Ottone & Nazaria Solferino, 2011. "Spectators versus stakeholders with or without veil of ignorance: The difference it makes for justice and chosen distribution criteria," Working Papers 204, ECINEQ, Society for the Study of Economic Inequality.
    2. Leonardo Becchetti & Giacomo Degli Antoni & Stefania Ottone & Nazaria Solferino, 2012. "Spectators Versus Stakeholders with/without Information: the Difference it Makes for Justice," CEIS Research Paper 221, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 20 Feb 2012.
    3. Francesco Farina & Stefania Ottone & Ferruccio Ponzano, 2019. "On the Collective Choice among Models of Social Protection: An Experimental Study," Games, MDPI, vol. 10(4), pages 1-17, October.
    4. Emin Karagözoglu & Arno Riedl, 2010. "Information, Uncertainty, and Subjective Entitlements in Bargaining," CESifo Working Paper Series 3133, CESifo.
    5. Grimalday, Gianluca & Karz, Anirban & Proto, Eugenio, 2012. "Everyone Wants a Chance: Initial Positions and Fairness in Ultimatum Games," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 93, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    6. Cetre, Sophie & Lobeck, Max & Senik, Claudia & Verdier, Thierry, 2019. "Preferences over income distribution: Evidence from a choice experiment," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    7. Cardella, Eric & Roomets, Alex, 2022. "Pay distribution preferences and productivity effects: An experiment," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 96(C).
    8. Sophie Cetre & Max Lobeck & Claudia Senik & Thierry Verdier, 2018. "In search of unanimously preferred income distributions. Evidence from a choice experiment," SciencePo Working papers Main halshs-01863359, HAL.
    9. Tausch, Franziska & Potters, Jan & Riedl, Arno, 2013. "Preferences for redistribution and pensions. What can we learn from experiments?," Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, Cambridge University Press, vol. 12(3), pages 298-325, July.
    10. Eisenkopf, Gerald & Fischbacher, Urs & Föllmi-Heusi, Franziska, 2013. "Unequal opportunities and distributive justice," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 51-61.
    11. Rafael Di Tella & Ricardo Pérez-Truglia, 2010. "Conveniently Upset: Avoiding Altruism by Distorting Beliefs About Others," NBER Working Papers 16645, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Gerber, Anke & Nicklisch, Andreas & Voigt, Stefan, 2019. "The role of ignorance in the emergence of redistribution," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 239-261.
    13. Simon Gächter & Arno Riedl, 2005. "Moral Property Rights in Bargaining with Infeasible Claims," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(2), pages 249-263, February.
    14. Gerald Eisenkopf, 2018. "Unequal Incentives and Perceived Fairness in Groups," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(3), pages 1-18, September.
    15. Fabio Galeotti & Reuben Kline & Raimondello Orsini, 2014. "When Foul Play Seems Fair: Dishonesty as a Response to Violations of Just Deserts," Post-Print halshs-02467507, HAL.
    16. Xu, Zhicheng & Palma, Marco A., 2015. "To buy or not buy (insurance)? An experiment on public funds distribution under different rooted risks," 2015 Annual Meeting, January 31-February 3, 2015, Atlanta, Georgia 196649, Southern Agricultural Economics Association.
    17. Gerald Eisenkopf, 2015. "Unequal Incentives and Perceived Fairness in Groups," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2015-03, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
    18. Michele Bernasconi & Enrico Longo & Valeria Maggian, 2023. "When merit breeds luck (or not): an experimental study on distributive justice," Working Papers 2023:02, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
    19. James Konow, 2003. "Which Is the Fairest One of All? A Positive Analysis of Justice Theories," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(4), pages 1188-1239, December.
    20. Simon G�chter & Arno Riedl, "undated". "Moral Property Rights in Bargaining," IEW - Working Papers 113, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    fairness; justice; performance; equality; luck;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:18:y:2018:i:1:p:14:n:1. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peter Golla (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.degruyter.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.