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Unequal Opportunities and Distributive Justice

  • Urs Fischbacher
  • Gerald Eisenkopf
  • Franziska Föllmi-Heusi

There is well established empirical evidence that more redistribution occurs when luck rather than performance determines the earnings. We provide experimental evidence on how unequal access to performance enhancing education affects demand for redistribution. In this experiment, we can control the information about the role of luck and effort. We find that unequal opportunities evoke a preference for redistribution that is comparable to the situation when luck alone determines the allocation rather than performance. Furthermore, unequal opportunities reduce performance incentives.

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Paper provided by Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz in its series TWI Research Paper Series with number 57.

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Date of creation: 2010
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Handle: RePEc:twi:respas:0057
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  1. Ruben Durante & Louis Putterman, 2007. "Preferences For Redistribution and Perception of Fairness: An Experimental Study," Working Papers 2007-13, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  2. Alberto Alesina & Eliana La Ferrara, . "Preferences for Redistribution in the Land of Opportunities," Working Papers 178, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
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