IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Subasta electrónica interactiva y subasta a sobre cerrado: Un análisis comparativo de los resultados en Bolivia

  • Walter Orellana Rocha

    (Banco Central de Bolivia)

  • Bernardo X. Fernández Tellería

    (Banco Central de Bolivia)

  • Vladimir Fernández Quiroga

    (Banco Central de Bolivia)

La subasta es el mecanismo fundamental por medio del cual el Banco Central de Bolivia (BCB) ejecuta sus operaciones de mercado abierto, instrumento principal de su política monetaria. Este mecanismo es utilizado también en la colocación de valores para financiamiento fiscal. Luego de varios años de utilizar una subasta a sobre cerrado y precio discriminante, el año 2005 el BCB implementó una subasta electrónica interactiva, cuya modalidad es conocida usualmente como inglesa abierta o de precios ascendentes. La teoría de subastas sostiene que el cambio de formato en éstas conlleva modificaciones importantes en las estrategias de los participantes y, por ende, en los resultados obtenidos. En síntesis, se esperaría que la aplicación de la nueva modalidad permita: a) la reducción de la llamada "maldición del ganador", b) una mayor participación en subasta, y c) la caída de los costos de financiamiento para el emisor. Con el fin de evaluar y verificar estos postulados teóricos, el presente estudio realiza una comparación de los resultados generados por ambos formatos de subasta, mediante un análisis estadístico descriptivo y la estimación econométrica de dos ecuaciones reducidas, las cuales pretenden representar el comportamiento de los agentes en subasta.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.bcb.gob.bo/webdocs/2011/Publicaciones/RevistaAnalisis/2006/Capitulo2final.pdf
Download Restriction: no

File URL: http://www.bcb.gob.bo/?q=node/901
Download Restriction: no

Article provided by Banco Central de Bolivia in its journal Revista de Análisis.

Volume (Year): 9 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (December)
Pages: 65-113

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:blv:journl:v:9:y:2006:i:1:p:65-113
Contact details of provider: Postal: Casilla Postal 3118, La Paz
Phone: (591 - 02) 374151
Web page: http://www.bcb.gob.bo/
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
  2. Patrick Bajari & Ali Hortacsu, 2003. "Are Structural Estimates of Auction Models Reasonable? Evidence from Experimental Data," NBER Working Papers 9889, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Umlauf, Steven R., 1993. "An empirical study of the Mexican Treasury bill auction," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 313-340, June.
  4. Olivier Armantier & Erwann Sbai, 2003. "Estimation and Comparison of Treasury Auction Formats when Bidders are Asymmetric," Department of Economics Working Papers 03-02, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
  5. Rothkopf, Michael H & Teisberg, Thomas J & Kahn, Edward P, 1990. "Why Are Vickrey Auctions Rare?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(1), pages 94-109, February.
  6. Philippe Février & Raphaële Preget & Michael Visser, 2002. "Econometrics of Share Auctions," Working Papers 2002-09, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
  7. Nyborg, Kjell G. & Sundaresan, Suresh, 1996. "Discriminatory versus uniform Treasury auctions: Evidence from when-issued transactions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 63-104, September.
  8. Marc S. Robinson, 1985. "Collusion and the Choice of Auction," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(1), pages 141-145, Spring.
  9. Saikat Nandi, 1997. "Treasury auctions: what do the recent models and results tell us?," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, issue Q 4, pages 4-15.
  10. C. Mónica Capra, 1999. "Subastas de títulos públicos en Bolivia," Revista de Análisis del BCB, Banco Central de Bolivia, vol. 2(2), pages 121-155, December.
  11. Alvin E. Roth & Axel Ockenfels, 2002. "Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1093-1103, September.
  12. Hansen, Robert G, 1985. "Empirical Testing of Auction Theory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(2), pages 156-59, May.
  13. Daniel Heller & Yvan Lengwiler, 1998. "The auctions of Swiss government bonds: should the Treasury price discriminate or not?," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1998-11, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  14. Patrick Bajari & Ali Horta�su, 2004. "Economic Insights from Internet Auctions," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 42(2), pages 457-486, June.
  15. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & Marek Pycia & Marzena Rostek & Marek Weretka, 2014. "Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 81(4), pages 1366-1400.
  16. Robert A. Feldman & Vincent Reinhart, 1996. "Auction Format Matters: Evidence on Bidding Behavior and Seller Revenue," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 43(2), pages 395-418, June.
  17. Sara Castellanos, 2001. "Mexican treasury securities primary auctions," Theory workshop papers 357966000000000025, UCLA Department of Economics.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:blv:journl:v:9:y:2006:i:1:p:65-113. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jose Antonio Caballero Pelaez)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.