Subasta electrónica interactiva y subasta a sobre cerrado: Un análisis comparativo de los resultados en Bolivia
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- Walter Orellana & Bernardo Fernández & Vladimir Fernández, 2006. "Subasta electrónica interactiva y subasta a sobre cerrado: un análisis comparativo de los resultados en Bolivia," Monetaria, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos, vol. 0(3), pages 299-345, julio-sep.
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More about this item
Keywordsteoría de subasta; valores públicos; Bolivia;
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
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