Eficiencia del sistema bancario mexicano 1997-2004: una estimación dinámica
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Volume (Year): XXIX (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 (julio-septiembre)
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- Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 1995. "Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 98wpdr, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 22 Jul 2002.
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03002, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
- Patrick Bajari & Ali Hortacsu, 2005. "Are Structural Estimates of Auction Models Reasonable? Evidence from Experimental Data," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(4), pages 703-741, August.
- Patrick Bajari & Ali Hortacsu, 2003. "Are Structural Estimates of Auction Models Reasonable? Evidence from Experimental Data," NBER Working Papers 9889, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Daniel Heller & Yvan Lengwiler, 1998. "The auctions of Swiss government bonds: should the Treasury price discriminate or not?," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1998-11, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Marc S. Robinson, 1985. "Collusion and the Choice of Auction," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(1), pages 141-145, Spring.
- Philippe Février & Raphaële Preget & Michael Visser, 2002. "Econometrics of Share Auctions," Working Papers 2002-09, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
- Paul Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, 1981.
"A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding,"
447R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Umlauf, Steven R., 1993. "An empirical study of the Mexican Treasury bill auction," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 313-340, June.
- Hansen, Robert G, 1985. "Empirical Testing of Auction Theory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(2), pages 156-59, May.
- Saikat Nandi, 1997. "Treasury auctions: what do the recent models and results tell us?," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, issue Q 4, pages 4-15.
- Patrick Bajari & Ali Horta�su, 2004. "Economic Insights from Internet Auctions," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 42(2), pages 457-486, June.
- Rothkopf, Michael H & Teisberg, Thomas J & Kahn, Edward P, 1990. "Why Are Vickrey Auctions Rare?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(1), pages 94-109, February.
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