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Import Protection Bias

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  • Paul Pecorino

Abstract

Rodrik (1995) notes that trade regimes tend to be biased towards import protection, while the standard political economy models either yield no prediction on the bias of the trade regime or predict, counterfactually, a bias towards the export sector. This constitutes an important shortcoming in the political economy of trade literature. In this paper, the Grossman and Helpman (1994) “Protection for Sale” model is extended by adding government expenditure. This expenditure may be financed via a combination of tariff revenue and a distorting wage tax. In addition to the government expenditure, export subsidies need to be financed either via tariff revenue or a distorting wage tax. With this addition, plausible values of the model's parameters yield import protection bias.

Suggested Citation

  • Paul Pecorino, 2008. "Import Protection Bias," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(2), pages 341-349, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:reviec:v:16:y:2008:i:2:p:341-349
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9396.2007.00717.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. By Kishore Gawande & Pravin Krishna & Marcelo Olarreaga, 2012. "Lobbying Competition Over Trade Policy," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(1), pages 115-132, February.
    2. Matschke, Xenia, 2008. "Costly revenue-raising and the case for favoring import-competing industries," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 143-157, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Djerdjian, Daron O., 2009. "Economies of scale and trade policy: The median voter model revisited," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 479-487, June.

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