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Economies of scale and trade policy: The median voter model revisited

  • Djerdjian, Daron O.
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    Why do some political economy models perform so poorly in predicting actual trade policy? Do scale economies provide the missing puzzle to our understanding of the anti-trade bias? By integrating economies of scale in production, this paper theoretically reinstates the median voter model as in Mayer [Mayer, W. (1984). Endogenous tariff formation. The American Economic Review, 74, 970-985] as a suitable political economy model in predicting trade policy. The modified model generates the scope for the anti-trade bias and predicts that sometimes economic, rather than political, considerations may lead to restrictive trade.

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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal International Review of Economics & Finance.

    Volume (Year): 18 (2009)
    Issue (Month): 3 (June)
    Pages: 479-487

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:reveco:v:18:y:2009:i:3:p:479-487
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/620165

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