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A model of mixed signals with applications to countersignalling

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  • Aloisio Araujo
  • Daniel Gottlieb
  • Humberto Moreira

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  • Aloisio Araujo & Daniel Gottlieb & Humberto Moreira, 2007. "A model of mixed signals with applications to countersignalling," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(4), pages 1020-1043, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:randje:v:38:y:2007:i:4:p:1020-1043
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.0741-6261.2007.00124.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    9. Hans K. Hvide, 2003. "Education and the Allocation of Talent," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(4), pages 945-976, October.
    10. Gottlieb, Daniel & Moreira, Humberto Ataíde & Araújo, Aloísio Pessoa de, 2004. "A model of mixed signals with applications to countersignaling an the GED," FGV EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 553, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil).
    11. Mathias Dewatripont & Ian Jewitt & Jean Tirole, 1999. "The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(1), pages 183-198.
    12. Grossman, Sanford J, 1981. "The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(3), pages 461-483, December.
    13. Engers, Maxim, 1987. "Signalling with Many Signals," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(3), pages 663-674, May.
    14. Benartzi, Shlomo & Michaely, Roni & Thaler, Richard H, 1997. "Do Changes in Dividends Signal the Future or the Past?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(3), pages 1007-1034, July.
    15. Mathias Dewatripont & Ian Jewitt & Jean Tirole, 1999. "The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 183-198.
    16. Roger Klein & Richard Spady & Andrew Weiss, 1991. "Factors Affecting the Output and Quit Propensities of Production Workers," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 58(5), pages 929-953.
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    19. Green, Jerry & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1990. "Competition on many fronts: A stackelberg signaling equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 247-272, September.
    20. Quinzii, Martine & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1985. "Multidimensional signalling," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 261-284, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dina Mayzlin & Jiwoong Shin, 2011. "Uninformative Advertising as an Invitation to Search," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 30(4), pages 666-685, July.
    2. Anna Boisits & Roland Königsgruber, 2016. "Information acquisition and disclosure by firms in the presence of additional available information," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 24(1), pages 177-205, March.
    3. Daniel Gottlieb & Kent Smetters, 2011. "Grade Non-Disclosure," NBER Working Papers 17465, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Sadowski, Philipp, 2016. "Overeagerness," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 131(PA), pages 114-125.
    5. Chia-Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida & Wing Suen, 2020. "Signaling under Double-Crossing Preferences," ISER Discussion Paper 1103r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Dec 2020.
    6. Chia‐Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida & Wing Suen, 2022. "Signaling Under Double‐Crossing Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(3), pages 1225-1260, May.
    7. Chia-Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida, 2017. "Rewarding Mediocrity? Optimal Regulation of R&D Markets with Reputation Concerns," ISER Discussion Paper 0994, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    8. Silva, Pedro Luís, 2022. "Specialists or All-Rounders: How Best to Select University Students?," IZA Discussion Papers 15271, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    9. Lex Borghans & Angela Lee Duckworth & James J. Heckman & Bas ter Weel, 2008. "The Economics and Psychology of Personality Traits," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 43(4).
    10. Eduardo de Carvalho Andrade & Luciano I. de Castro, 2008. "Tougher Educational Exam Leading to Worse Selection," Discussion Papers 1469, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    11. Eduardo Andrade & Luciano De Castro, 2010. "Tougher Educational Exam Leading to Worse Selection," Discussion Papers 1533, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    12. Liu, Shuo & Pei, Harry, 2020. "Monotone equilibria in signaling games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 124(C).
    13. Chia-Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida & Wing Suen, 2022. "Signaling under Double-Crossing Preferences: The Case of Discrete Types," ISER Discussion Paper 1166, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    14. Harbaugh, Richmond & To, Theodore, 2020. "False modesty: When disclosing good news looks bad," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 43-55.
    15. Yi-Chun Chen & Siyang Xiong, 2008. "Topologies on Types: Connections," Discussion Papers 1470, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    16. Chia-Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida & Wing Suen, 2020. "Signaling under Double-Crossing Preferences," ISER Discussion Paper 1103, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    17. Schottmüller, Christoph, 2015. "Adverse selection without single crossing: Monotone solutions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PA), pages 127-164.
    18. Junichiro Ishida & Wing Suen, 2023. "Pecuniary Emulation and Invidious Distinction: Signaling under Behavioral Diversity," ISER Discussion Paper 1216, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    19. Maté Fodor & Jean Luc De Meulemeester & Denis Rochat, 2019. "The Wavering Economic Thought About The Link Between Education And Growth," Working Papers CEB 19-006, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    20. de Carvalho Andrade, Eduardo & de Castro, Luciano I., 2011. "Tougher educational exam leading to worse selection," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), vol. 5, pages 1-24.
    21. Chung, Kim-Sau & Eső, Péter, 2013. "Persuasion and learning by countersignaling," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 121(3), pages 487-491.

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