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Regulierung versus Deregulierung im Öffentlichen Personennahverkehr – Das Modell eines Nutzerklubs

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  • Dirk Meyer

Abstract

Network effects, economies of scope as well as irreversibilities and subadditive cost functions are characteristics of public passenger transport systems. The proposal of a user club shows that a collective requirement to act can be covered even without state regulations. The club bears the responsibility for a sufficient public transport supply, which local jurisdictions can supplement by their own means. In a public tendering, the club confers the actual supply planning to the management company, which in turn chooses qualified bidders for the carrying out of the public transport services. The different problems of long‐run irreversible investments (railway system), an appropriate structure of transport fares to prevent a cherry‐picking by outsiders, the stability of the club as well as the role of the state are treated separately.

Suggested Citation

  • Dirk Meyer, 2002. "Regulierung versus Deregulierung im Öffentlichen Personennahverkehr – Das Modell eines Nutzerklubs," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 3(1), pages 69-84, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:perwir:v:3:y:2002:i:1:p:69-84
    DOI: 10.1111/1468-2516.00075
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mohring, Herbert, 1972. "Optimization and Scale Economies in Urban Bus Transportation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(4), pages 591-604, September.
    2. Faulhaber, Gerald R, 1975. "Cross-Subsidization: Pricing in Public Enterprises," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(5), pages 966-977, December.
    3. Ng, Yew-Kwang, 1973. "The Economic Theory of Clubs: Pareto Optimality Conditions," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 40(159), pages 291-298, August.
    4. Sandler, Todd & Tschirhart, John T, 1980. "The Economic Theory of Clubs: An Evaluative Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 18(4), pages 1481-1521, December.
    5. Faulhaber, Gerald R & Levinson, Stephen B, 1981. "Subsidy-Free Prices and Anonymous Equity [Cross-Subsidization: Pricing in Public Enterprises]," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(5), pages 1083-1091, December.
    6. Evans, A., 1991. "Are Urban Bus Services Natural Monopolies?," Papers 90-19, Flinders of South Australia - Discipline of Economics.
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    Cited by:

    1. Walter Buhr, 2003. "What is infrastructure?," Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 107-03, Universität Siegen, Fakultät Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht.

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