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The Dynamics Of Microinsurance Demand In Developing Countries Under Liquidity Constraints And Insurer Default Risk

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  • Yanyan Liu
  • Robert J. Myers

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  • Yanyan Liu & Robert J. Myers, 2016. "The Dynamics Of Microinsurance Demand In Developing Countries Under Liquidity Constraints And Insurer Default Risk," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 83(1), pages 121-138, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jrinsu:v:83:y:2016:i:1:p:121-138
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Cummins, J David & Mahul, Olivier, 2003. "Optimal Insurance with Divergent Beliefs about Insurer Total Default Risk," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 121-138, October.
    2. Kimball, Miles S, 1990. "Precautionary Saving in the Small and in the Large," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(1), pages 53-73, January.
    3. MOSSIN, Jan, 1968. "Aspects of rational insurance purchasing," LIDAM Reprints CORE 23, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    4. Shawn Cole & Xavier Gine & Jeremy Tobacman & Petia Topalova & Robert Townsend & James Vickery, 2013. "Barriers to Household Risk Management: Evidence from India," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 104-135, January.
    5. Deaton, Angus, 1991. "Saving and Liquidity Constraints," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(5), pages 1221-1248, September.
    6. Ghatak, Maitreesh, 1999. "Group lending, local information and peer selection," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 27-50, October.
    7. Alexander Karaivanov & Fernando Martin, 2015. "Dynamic Optimal Insurance and Lack of Commitment," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 18(2), pages 287-305, April.
    8. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1995. "Group lending, repayment incentives and social collateral," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 1-18, February.
    9. Christian Gollier, 2003. "To Insure or Not to Insure?: An Insurance Puzzle," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 28(1), pages 5-24, June.
    10. S. Rao Aiyagari, 1994. "Uninsured Idiosyncratic Risk and Aggregate Saving," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 109(3), pages 659-684.
    11. Helge Braun & Winfried Koeniger, 2007. "On the role of market insurance in a dynamic model," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 32(1), pages 61-90, June.
    12. Armendariz de Aghion, Beatriz, 1999. "On the design of a credit agreement with peer monitoring," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 79-104, October.
    13. Neil A. Doherty & Harris Schlesinger, 1990. "Rational Insurance Purchasing: Consideration of Contract Nonperformance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 105(1), pages 243-253.
    14. Abhijit V. Banerjee & Timothy Besley & Timothy W. Guinnane, 1994. "Thy Neighbor's Keeper: The Design of a Credit Cooperative with Theory and a Test," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 109(2), pages 491-515.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jensen, Nathaniel D. & Mude, Andrew G. & Barrett, Christopher B., 2018. "How basis risk and spatiotemporal adverse selection influence demand for index insurance: Evidence from northern Kenya," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 172-198.
    2. Biener, Christian & Landmann, Andreas & Santana, Maria Isabel, 2019. "Contract nonperformance risk and uncertainty in insurance markets," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 65-83.
    3. Shirley J. Ho & Hsiu-Hao Hsu, 0. "The effect of microinsurance on the insurance market: evidence from Taiwan," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 0, pages 1-16.
    4. Peter, Richard & Ying, Jie, 2020. "Do you trust your insurer? Ambiguity about contract nonperformance and optimal insurance demand," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 938-954.
    5. Glenn W. Harrison & Jia Min Ng, 2018. "Welfare effects of insurance contract non-performance," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, Springer;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 43(1), pages 39-76, May.
    6. Casaburi, Lorenzo & ,, 2018. "Time vs. State in Insurance: Experimental Evidence from Contract Farming in Kenya," CEPR Discussion Papers 12896, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Aurélien Baillon & Aleli Kraft & Owen O’Donnell & Kim Wilgenburg, 2022. "A behavioral decomposition of willingness to pay for health insurance," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 64(1), pages 43-87, February.
    8. Isaac Akomea-Frimpong & Caleb Boadi & Roger Owusu-Boafo, 2021. "Determinants and challenges of supplying microlife insurance in Ghana," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 46(3), pages 331-357, July.
    9. Jos'e Miguel Flores-Contr'o & Kira Henshaw & Sooie-Hoe Loke & S'everine Arnold & Corina Constantinescu, 2021. "Subsidising Inclusive Insurance to Reduce Poverty," Papers 2103.17255, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.
    10. Hui Li & Seth Neumuller & Casey Rothschild, 2021. "Optimal annuitization with imperfect information about insolvency risk," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 88(1), pages 101-130, March.
    11. Reichel, Lukas & Schmeiser, Hato & Schreiber, Florian, 2021. "Sometimes more, sometimes less: Prudence and the diversification of risky insurance coverage," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 292(2), pages 770-783.
    12. Shirley J. Ho & Hsiu-Hao Hsu, 2021. "The effect of microinsurance on the insurance market: evidence from Taiwan," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 46(1), pages 130-145, January.
    13. Anita Mukherjee & Shawn Cole & Jeremy Tobacman, 2021. "Targeting weather insurance markets," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 88(3), pages 757-784, September.

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