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Optimal Insurance with Divergent Beliefs about Insurer Total Default Risk

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  • Cummins, J David
  • Mahul, Olivier

Abstract

This paper extends the classic expected utility theory analysis of optimal insurance contracting to the case where the insurer has a positive probability of total default and the buyer and insurer have divergent beliefs about this probability. The optimal marginal indemnity above the deductible is smaller (greater) than one if the buyer's assessment of default risk is more pessimistic (optimistic) than the insurer's. As an application of the model, we consider the market for reinsurance against catastrophic property loss and propose an expected utility theory explanation for the increasing and concave marginal indemnity schedule observed in this market. Copyright 2003 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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  • Cummins, J David & Mahul, Olivier, 2003. "Optimal Insurance with Divergent Beliefs about Insurer Total Default Risk," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 121-138, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:jrisku:v:27:y:2003:i:2:p:121-38
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Stephens, Eric & Thompson, James R., 2014. "CDS as insurance: Leaky lifeboats in stormy seas," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 279-299.
    2. Jiazhen Peng & Xiaojun Shan & Yang Gao & Yohannes Kesete & Rachel Davidson & Linda Nozick & Jamie Kruse, 2014. "Modeling the integrated roles of insurance and retrofit in managing natural disaster risk: a multi-stakeholder perspective," Natural Hazards: Journal of the International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, Springer;International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, vol. 74(2), pages 1043-1068, November.
    3. Chen Li & Xiaohu Li, 2018. "On the Optimal Risk Sharing in Reinsurance with Random Recovery Rate," Risks, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 6(4), pages 1-16, October.
    4. Eric LANGLAIS, 2008. "On Insurance Contract Design For Low Probability Events," Journal of Applied Economic Sciences, Spiru Haret University, Faculty of Financial Management and Accounting Craiova, vol. 3(2(4)_Summ).
    5. Radoslav Raykov, 2015. "Catastrophe insurance equilibrium with correlated claims," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 78(1), pages 89-115, January.
    6. Strauss, Jason, 2007. "Equilibrium in the Insurance Industry: Price and Probability of Insolvency," MPRA Paper 11015, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Dwight Jaffee & Johan Walden, 2014. "Optimal Insurance With Costly Internal Capital," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 17(2), pages 137-161, September.
    8. Glenn W. Harrison & Jia Min Ng, 2018. "Welfare effects of insurance contract non-performance," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 43(1), pages 39-76, May.
    9. Yanyan Liu & Robert J. Myers, 2016. "The Dynamics Of Microinsurance Demand In Developing Countries Under Liquidity Constraints And Insurer Default Risk," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 83(1), pages 121-138, January.
    10. Roman N. Schulze & Thomas Post, 2010. "Individual Annuity Demand Under Aggregate Mortality Risk," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 77(2), pages 423-449, June.
    11. Strauss, Jason, 2006. "The Impact of Price Controls on Mandatory Automobile Insurance Markets," MPRA Paper 11016, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Eric Stephens & James R. Thompson, 2015. "Separation Without Exclusion in Financial Insurance," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 82(4), pages 853-864, December.
    13. Feria-Domínguez, José Manuel & Jiménez-Rodríguez, Enrique & Sholarin, Ola, 2015. "Tackling the over-dispersion of operational risk: Implications on capital adequacy requirements," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 206-221.
    14. Boonen, Tim J., 2019. "Equilibrium recoveries in insurance markets with limited liability," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 38-45.
    15. Strauss, Jason, 2007. "Price Regulation, Market Exit, and Financial Leverage of Canadian Property-Liability Insurers," MPRA Paper 11212, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 28 Oct 2008.
    16. Yohannes Kesete & Jiazhen Peng & Yang Gao & Xiaojun Shan & Rachel A. Davidson & Linda K. Nozick & Jamie Kruse, 2014. "Modeling Insurer‐Homeowner Interactions in Managing Natural Disaster Risk," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 34(6), pages 1040-1055, June.
    17. Biener, Christian & Landmann, Andreas & Santana, Maria Isabel, 2019. "Contract nonperformance risk and uncertainty in insurance markets," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 65-83.
    18. Enrico Biffis & Erik Chavez & Alexis Louaas & Pierre Picard, 2020. "Parametric insurance and technology adoption in developing countries," Working Papers hal-02875530, HAL.

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