THE VALUE OF PRIVATE INFORMATION IN MONOPOLY -super-
We investigate a basic question about a monopoly with incomplete information: when does the seller have an incentive to allow potential buyers to acquire more private information about their tastes for the seller's product? Under plausible conditions such as log-concave density of willingness-to-pay and convex marginal cost, the seller prefers that the paying customers be well informed as a group but be left in the dark regarding their individual tastes. Copyright 2008 The Authors.
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Volume (Year): 56 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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