Increases in Executive Pay Following Privatization
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DOI: 10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00327.x
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Evans, Lewis, 1998. "The Critical Importance of Information: Incentive Regulation and its Application in Electricity," Working Paper Series 19034, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
- Alex Bryson & John Forth & Minghai Zhou, 2014.
"Same or Different? The CEO Labour Market in China's Public Listed Companies,"
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 124(574), pages 90-108, February.
- Bryson, Alex & Forth, John & Zhou, Minghai, 2014. "Same or different? The CEO labour market in China's public listed companies," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 56054, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- repec:vuw:vuwscr:19024 is not listed on IDEAS
- Lea, Stephen E.G. & Webley, Paul, 2005. "In search of the economic self," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 34(5), pages 585-604, October.
- Natalia Pimenta Monteiro, 2010.
"Using propensity matching estimators to evaluate the impact of privatization on wages,"
Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 42(10), pages 1293-1313.
- Natália Pimenta Monteiro, 2004. "Using propensity matching estimators to evaluate the impact of privatisation on wages," NIPE Working Papers 12/2004, NIPE - Universidade do Minho.
- Natalia Pimenta Monteiro, 2004. "Using Propensity Matching Estimators To Evaluate The Impact Of Privatisation On Wages," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2004 61, Royal Economic Society.
- Jeffry M. Netter & William L. Megginson, 2001. "From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(2), pages 321-389, June.
- Amihai Glazer & Hideki Konishi, "undated". "Why High-level Executives Earn Less in the Governmental Than in the Private Sector," Working Papers 2215, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.
- Firth, Michael & Fung, Peter M.Y. & Rui, Oliver M., 2007. "How ownership and corporate governance influence chief executive pay in China's listed firms," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 60(7), pages 776-785, July.
- NZ Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation Inc, 1999. "The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail," Treasury Working Paper Series 99/10, New Zealand Treasury.
- Hadley, Brandy, 2019. "Executive compensation and political sensitivity: Evidence from government contractors," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 276-301.
- Evans, Lewis, 1998. "The Critical Importance of Information: Incentive Regulation and its Application in Electricity," Working Paper Series 3935, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
- repec:dau:papers:123456789/3860 is not listed on IDEAS
- Gloria Cuevas-Rodríguez & Jaime Guerrero-Villegas & Ramón Valle-Cabrera, 2019. "Privatization and organizational changes: Evidence from Spain," Working Papers 19.04, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Business Organization and Marketing (former Department of Business Administration), revised Jun 2019.
- The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation Inc., 1999. "The Privatization of New Zealand Rail Part 2: Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis," Working Paper Series 3925, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
- Amihai Glazer & Hideki Konishi, 2017. "Why High-level Executives Earn Less in the Government Than in the Private Sector," Working Papers 1713, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.
- Nancy L. Rose & Catherine Wolfram, 2000. "Regulating Executive Pay: Using the Tax Code to Influence CEO Compensation," NBER Working Papers 7842, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- repec:vuw:vuwscr:19034 is not listed on IDEAS
- Monteiro, Natalia Pimenta, 2003.
"The Impact of Privatisation on Wages: Evidence from the Portugese Banking Industry,"
Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003
156, Royal Economic Society.
- Natália Pimenta Monteiro, 2004. "The impact of Privatisation on Wages: Evidence from the Portuguese Banking Industry," NIPE Working Papers 11/2004, NIPE - Universidade do Minho.
- Gloria Cuevas-Rodriguez & Jaime Guerrero-Villegas & Ramón Valle-Cabrera, 2014. "Privatization effects on corporate governance, strategy and compensation systems," Working Papers 14.03, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Business Organization and Marketing (former Department of Business Administration).
- Debande, Olivier & Friebel, Guido, 2004. "A positive theory of give-away privatization," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(8-9), pages 1309-1325, November.
- The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation, 1999. "The Privatization of New Zealand Rail Part 2: Quantitative Cost Benefit Analysis," Working Paper Series 19024, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
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