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Towards A Comparative Institutional Analysis: Motivations And Some Tentative Theorizing

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  • MASAHIKO AOKI

Abstract

This volume collects 22 articles by Masahiko Aoki, selected from writings published over the course of his 45-year academic career. These fascinating essays cover a range of issues, including mechanism design, comparative governance, corporate governance, institutions and institutional change, but are tied together by a focus on East Asia and a comparative institutional framework.
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Suggested Citation

  • Masahiko Aoki, 1996. "Towards A Comparative Institutional Analysis: Motivations And Some Tentative Theorizing," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 47(1), pages 1-19, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jecrev:v:47:y:1996:i:1:p:1-19
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1468-5876.1996.tb00031.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 1-29, February.
    2. repec:ner:ucllon:http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/17678/ is not listed on IDEAS
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    Cited by:

    1. Gagliardi, Francesca, 2017. "Institutions and economic change," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 213-215.
    2. Ruttan, Vernon W., 2002. "Social Science Knowledge And Institutional Innovation," Staff Papers 13628, University of Minnesota, Department of Applied Economics.
    3. Lihua Zhang & Hans Sjögren & Miki Kishida, 2016. "The emergence and organizational persistence of business groups in China, Japan, and Sweden," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 25(6), pages 885-902.
    4. Gagliardi, Francesca, 2008. "Institutions and economic change: A critical survey of the new institutional approaches and empirical evidence," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 416-443, February.
    5. Ruttan, Vernon W., 2006. "Social science knowledge and induced institutional innovation: an institutional design perspective," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 2(3), pages 249-272, December.
    6. Meyer, Claas & Chen, Cheng & Matzdorf, Bettina, 2018. "Qualitative comparative institutional analysis of environmental governance: Implications from research on payments for ecosystem services," Ecosystem Services, Elsevier, vol. 34(PB), pages 169-180.
    7. Munshifwa, Ephraim Kabunda, 2023. "Institutional analysis and informal urban settlements: A proposition for a new institutionalist grounded property rights perspective," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 134(C).
    8. Zachariah Mampilly & Megan A. Stewart, 2021. "A Typology of Rebel Political Institutional Arrangements," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 65(1), pages 15-45, January.
    9. Majumdar, Sumit K., 2016. "Debt and communications technology diffusion: Retrospective evidence," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 458-474.

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