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Explaining EMU Reform

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  • SHAWN DONNELLY

Abstract

This article develops a model to explain the roles of national governments in the reform process of rules for economic and monetary union (EMU) in Europe. A study of Germany, France and Spain underlines the importance of electoral politics and institutional arrangements in producing distinctive policy triangles on domestic economic and budget policy, and subsequent demands for specific EMU rules. It employs budget policy analysis to illustrate the collapse of stabilization state politics in France and Germany, leading to the reform of the Stability Pact in March 2005.

Suggested Citation

  • Shawn Donnelly, 2005. "Explaining EMU Reform," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(5), pages 947-968, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:43:y:2005:i:5:p:947-968
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5965.2005.00603.x
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    1. Mark Hallerberg & Jürgen von Hagen, 1999. "Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and Budget Deficits in the European Union," NBER Chapters, in: Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance, pages 209-232, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    4. Cukierman Alex, 1992. "CENTRAL BANK STRATEGY, CREDIBILITY, AND INDEPENDANCE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE: Compte Rendu par Dominique Cariofillo," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 3(4), pages 581-590, December.
    5. James M. Poterba & Jürgen von Hagen, 1999. "Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number pote99-1, July.
    6. James M. Poterba & Jürgen von Hagen, 1999. "Introduction to "Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance"," NBER Chapters, in: Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance, pages 1-12, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Hallerberg, Mark & von Hagen, Jürgen, 1997. "Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and Budget Deficits within the European Union," CEPR Discussion Papers 1555, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Schmidt, Vivien A., 2002. "The Futures of European Capitalism," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199253685, Decembrie.
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