IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/glopol/v11y2020i3p400-402.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Jurisdictional Competition in the International Financial System

Author

Listed:
  • Edward Price

Abstract

Policy makers, economic or otherwise, are increasingly interested in global trade. Largely, this is due to the advent of 21st century protectionism in the form of tariffs on goods, raw materials and concerns over proliferated intellectual property (IP). The same policy makers should, however, also study jurisdictional competition in the international financial system. This more subtle phenomenon entails examining how jurisdictions attempt a balancing act to gain positive net economic effects of financial capital via their financial regulation and economic policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Edward Price, 2020. "Jurisdictional Competition in the International Financial System," Global Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 11(3), pages 400-402, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:glopol:v:11:y:2020:i:3:p:400-402
    DOI: 10.1111/1758-5899.12789
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12789
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/1758-5899.12789?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2009. "Varieties of Crises and Their Dates," Introductory Chapters, in: This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, Princeton University Press.
    2. Li, Chunding & Whalley, John, 2021. "Trade protectionism and US manufacturing employment," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 353-361.
    3. repec:rnp:ecopol:09111 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Berger, Allen N. & Molyneux, Philip & Wilson, John O.S. (ed.), 2014. "The Oxford Handbook of Banking, Second Edition," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199688500.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Albertazzi, Ugo & Barbiero, Francesca & Marqués-Ibáñez, David & Popov, Alexander & Rodriguez d’Acri, Costanza & Vlassopoulos, Thomas, 2020. "Monetary policy and bank stability: the analytical toolbox reviewed," Working Paper Series 2377, European Central Bank.
    2. Dani Rodrik, 2018. "Populism and the economics of globalization," Journal of International Business Policy, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 1(1), pages 12-33, June.
    3. Daisuke Ikeda & Toan Phan & Timothy Sablik, 2020. "Asset Bubbles and Global Imbalances," Richmond Fed Economic Brief, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, vol. 20, pages 1-4, January.
    4. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2014. "Recovery from Financial Crises: Evidence from 100 Episodes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(5), pages 50-55, May.
    5. Scott E. Page, 2012. "A complexity perspective on institutional design," Politics, Philosophy & Economics, , vol. 11(1), pages 5-25, February.
    6. Steven J. Davis & John C. Haltiwanger & Kyle Handley & Ben Lipsius & Josh Lerner & Javier Miranda, 2021. "The economic effects of private equity buyouts," Jena Economics Research Papers 2021-013, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    7. Michael Redmond & Willem Van Zandweghe, 2016. "The Lasting Damage from the Financial Crisis to U.S. Productivity," Macro Bulletin, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 1-3, March.
    8. Manuel Funke & Moritz Schularick & Christoph Trebesch, 2023. "Populist Leaders and the Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 113(12), pages 3249-3288, December.
    9. Roos, Michael W. M., 2015. "The macroeconomics of radical uncertainty," Ruhr Economic Papers 592, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    10. Christoph Trebesch, 2019. "Resolving sovereign debt crises: the role of political risk," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(2), pages 421-444.
    11. Pogany, Peter, 2013. "Thermodynamic Isolation and the New World Order," MPRA Paper 49924, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Prabheesh, K.P. & Anglingkusumo, Reza & Juhro, Solikin M., 2021. "The dynamics of global financial cycle and domestic economic cycles: Evidence from India and Indonesia," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 831-842.
    13. Röhrs, Sigrid & Winter, Christoph, 2017. "Reducing government debt in the presence of inequality," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 1-20.
    14. İbrahim Özmen & Mihai Mutascu, 2024. "Public Debt and Growth: New Insights," Journal of the Knowledge Economy, Springer;Portland International Center for Management of Engineering and Technology (PICMET), vol. 15(2), pages 8706-8736, June.
    15. Thanh C. Nguyen & Vítor Castro & Justine Wood, 2022. "Political environment and financial crises," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(1), pages 417-438, January.
    16. Till Treeck, 2014. "Did Inequality Cause The U.S. Financial Crisis?," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(3), pages 421-448, July.
    17. Janice Boucher Breuer & John McDermott, 2019. "Debt And Depression," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 37(4), pages 714-730, October.
    18. Reischmann, Markus, 2016. "Creative accounting and electoral motives: Evidence from OECD countries," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 243-257.
    19. Jonathan Donier & Jean-Philippe Bouchaud, 2015. "Why Do Markets Crash? Bitcoin Data Offers Unprecedented Insights," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 10(10), pages 1-11, October.
    20. Javier Bianchi & Enrique G. Mendoza, 2018. "Optimal Time-Consistent Macroprudential Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(2), pages 588-634.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:glopol:v:11:y:2020:i:3:p:400-402. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/lsepsuk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.