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Does competition influence bank failures?

  • Zuzana Fungáčová
  • Laurent Weill

There has been a notable debate in the banking literature on the impact of bank competition on financial stability. While the dominant view sees a detrimental impact of competition on the stability of banks, this view has recently been challenged by Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) who see the reverse effect. The aim of this paper is to contribute to this literature by providing the first empirical investigation of the role of bank competition on the occurrence of bank failures. We analyze this issue based on a large sample of Russian banks over the period 2001-2007 and in line with the previous literature we employ the Lerner index as the metric of bank competition. Our findings clearly support the view that tighter bank competition enhances the occurrence of bank failures. The normative implication of our findings is therefore that measures that increase bank competition could undermine financial stability.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/10.1111/ecot.12013
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Article provided by The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in its journal Economics of Transition.

Volume (Year): 21 (2013)
Issue (Month): 2 (04)
Pages: 301-322

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Handle: RePEc:bla:etrans:v:21:y:2013:i:2:p:301-322
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  1. Styrin Konstantin, 2005. "X-inefficiency, Moral Hazard, and Bank Failures," EERC Working Paper Series 01-258e-2, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS.
  2. Maudos, Joaquin & de Guevara, Juan Fernandez, 2007. "The cost of market power in banking: Social welfare loss vs. cost inefficiency," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(7), pages 2103-2125, July.
  3. Carbó, Santiago & Humphrey, David & Maudos, Joaquín & Molyneux, Philip, 2009. "Cross-country comparisons of competition and pricing power in European banking," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 115-134, February.
  4. Marco Arena, 2005. "Bank Failures and Bank Fundamentals: A Comparative Analysis of Latin America and East Asia during the Nineties using Bank-Level Data," Staff Working Papers 05-19, Bank of Canada.
  5. Glushkova, Ekaterina & Vernikov, Andrei, 2009. "How big is the visible hand of the state in the Russian banking industry?," MPRA Paper 15563, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Gabriel Jiménez & Jose A. Lopez & Jesús Saurina, 2010. "How Does Competition Impact Bank Risk-Taking?," Working Papers 1005, Banco de España;Working Papers Homepage.
  7. Beck, Thorsten & Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Levine, Ross, 2006. "Bank concentration, competition, and crises: First results," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 1581-1603, May.
  8. Claeys, Sophie & Schoors, Koen, 2007. "Bank supervision Russian style: Evidence of conflicts between micro- and macroprudential concerns," Working Paper Series 205, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden).
  9. Berger, Allen N. & Klapper, Leora F. & Turk-Ariss, Rima, 2008. "Bank competition and financial stability," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4696, The World Bank.
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  11. Gianni De Nicolo & Elena Loukoianova, 2007. "Bank ownership, market structure, and risk," Proceedings 1058, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  12. Martin Cihak & Simon Wolfe & Klaus Schaeck, 2006. "Are More Competitive Banking Systems More Stable?," IMF Working Papers 06/143, International Monetary Fund.
  13. Matutes, Carmen & Vives, Xavier, 2000. "Imperfect competition, risk taking, and regulation in banking," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 1-34, January.
  14. David C. Wheelock & Paul W. Wilson, 1995. "Why do banks disappear? The determinants of U.S. bank failures and acquisitions," Working Papers 1995-013, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
  15. Karas, Alexei & Pyle, William & Schoors, Koen, 2006. "Sophisticated discipline in a nascent deposit market : evidence from post-communist Russia," BOFIT Discussion Papers 13/2006, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
  16. Juan Fernández de Guevara & Joaquín Maudos & Francisco Pérez, 2005. "Market Power in European Banking Sectors," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 27(2), pages 109-137, April.
  17. John H. Boyd & Gianni De Nicolã, 2005. "The Theory of Bank Risk Taking and Competition Revisited," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(3), pages 1329-1343, 06.
  18. Solís, Liliana & Maudos, Joaquín, 2008. "The social costs of bank market power: Evidence from Mexico," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 467-488, September.
  19. Anatoly Peresetsky & Alexandr Karminsky & Sergei Golovan, 2011. "Probability of default models of Russian banks," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 44(4), pages 297-334, November.
  20. Gianni De Nicolo & Abu M. Jalal & John H. Boyd, 2006. "Bank Risk-Taking and Competition Revisited; New Theory and New Evidence," IMF Working Papers 06/297, International Monetary Fund.
  21. Ece Ungan & Selçuk Caner & Süheyla Özyıldırım, 2008. "Depositors’ Assessment of Bank Riskiness in the Russian Federation," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 33(2), pages 77-100, April.
  22. David Martinez-Miera & Rafael Repullo, 2010. "Does Competition Reduce the Risk of Bank Failure?," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 23(10), pages 3638-3664, October.
  23. Caminal, Ramon & Matutes, Carmen, 2002. "Market power and banking failures," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(9), pages 1341-1361, November.
  24. Maudos, Joaquin & Fernandez de Guevara, Juan, 2006. "The cost of market power in banking: social welfare loss vs. inefficiency cost," MPRA Paper 15253, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  25. Camara, Modibo K. & Montes-Negret, Fernando, 2006. "Deposit insurance and banking reform in Russia," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4056, The World Bank.
  26. Männasoo, Kadri & Mayes, David G., 2009. "Explaining bank distress in Eastern European transition economies," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 244-253, February.
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