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Groundwater Management Through Collective Participation: Why Some Institutions Succeed And Others Fail?

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  • Ram RANJAN

Abstract

type="main" xml:lang="fr"> En réponse à des situations prolongées de sécheresse, des collectifs de gestion d'eau ont été instaurés et existent dans la plupart des régions agraires où l'eau est rare afin de contribuer à une gestion durable des ressources de nappes phréatiques. Cependant la durabilité même des collectifs est compromise par la réduction des nappes phréatiques et par le risque de perte irrémédiable dans le futur. L'impact de ce risque sur le succès ou l'échec des collectifs de gestion des nappes phréatiques est mal compris. Dans cet article les auteurs développent un modèle stylisé d'optimisation dynamique de participation institutionnelle et analysent les résultats pour plusieurs cas de comportements agricoles collectifs et non collectifs. Les résultats indiquent que le risque peut augmenter la tendance à se comporter en passager clandestin et exacerber la réduction des nappes phréatiques. Cette tendance peut augmenter avec un collectif plus grand lorsqu'il n'y a pas de mécanismes de dissuasion en place. Cependant, lorsque la décision de ne pas participer menace la stabilité de l'institution, mieux vaut pour le fermier qui maximise son profit de joindre le collectif et contribuer à la conservation de la nappe phréatique.

Suggested Citation

  • Ram RANJAN, 2014. "Groundwater Management Through Collective Participation: Why Some Institutions Succeed And Others Fail?," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 85(3), pages 427-452, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:annpce:v:85:y:2014:i:3:p:427-452
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    1. Iftekhar, Md Sayed & Fogarty, James, 2022. "Benefits of a groundwater allocation trading arrangement in a water-stressed environment," Agricultural Water Management, Elsevier, vol. 269(C).

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