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Public Choice and the EPA, 20 Years Later: An Exploratory Study

Author

Listed:
  • Richard J. Cebula
  • Franklin G. Mixon Jr.
  • Kamal P. Upadhyaya

Abstract

Nearly 20 years ago, Mixon (1995) found that urban warming is positively related to the probability of an EPA citation for a violation of carbon emissions standards, whereas lobbying effort reduces the probability of such a citation. This study revisits the Mixon (1995) framework by using data on ozone violations. The results indicate that EPA citations for ozone violations are not significantly related to lobbying effort.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard J. Cebula & Franklin G. Mixon Jr. & Kamal P. Upadhyaya, 2014. "Public Choice and the EPA, 20 Years Later: An Exploratory Study," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 73(2), pages 341-352, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ajecsc:v:73:y:2014:i:2:p:341-352
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Wang, Hua & Wheeler, David, 2005. "Financial incentives and endogenous enforcement in China's pollution levy system," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 174-196, January.
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    8. Franklin G. Mixon Jr., 2002. "Does Legislative Television Alter the Relationship Between Voters and Politicians?," Rationality and Society, , vol. 14(1), pages 109-128, February.
    9. Franklin G. Mixon, 1994. "What Can Regulators Regulate," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(4), pages 403-414, October.
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    11. Upadhyaya, Kamal P. & Raymond, Jeannie E. & Mixon, Franklin Jr., 1997. "The economic theory of regulation versus alternative theories for the electric utilities industry: A simultaneous probit model," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 191-202, August.
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    Cited by:

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    3. Jodi L. Short, 2021. "The politics of regulatory enforcement and compliance: Theorizing and operationalizing political influences," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(3), pages 653-685, July.
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